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GLOBAL GADFLIES: APPLICATIONS
AND IMPLICATIONS OF U.S.-STYLE CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE ABROAD
I. INTRODUCTION
Over the past decade, international business participants have come to
recognize that the structure of corporate governance' is more than a local
custom to be accepted by default.2 Rather, such local structures are
increasingly recognized as substantive factors affecting the relative
desirability of particular markets.3 The Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD), a major international economic think-
tank, has commented, "given the important institutional differences among
countries concerning the corporate governance structure, some differences
in the cost of capital are likely to persist in the future."4
The cost of capital is, of course, a major factor affecting a given
markets' appeal to investors.' Competition to liberalize markets in order
to attract foreign investors is the "most important policy trend of the 1990s
for international investment."6 However, "the greater freedom this gives
1. Corporate governance has recently been defined as:
[T]he legal and practical system for the exercise of power and control in the
conduct of the business of a corporation, including in particular the relationship
among the shareholders, the board of directors and its committees, the executive
officers, and other constituencies (such as employees, local communities, and
major customers and suppliers.
Warren Grienenberger, Institutional Shareholders and Corporate Governance, 875 PLI
Corp. 355 at I.A.3.(1995). Compare infra part III.A.I. (CalPERS' definition of corporate
governance).
2. Fund Urges Europe Corporate Reform, REUTERS, Sept. 6, 1995, available in
LEXIS, Nexis Library, Reuters File.
3. INTERNtiONAL INIEGRATioN OF FmNANAL MARKETS AND THE COST OF CAPiTAL, EcoNOMcS
DEPARTMENT WORKING PAPERS, NO. 128, by MITSUHIRO FUKAO, Money and Finance Division,
ORGANISATION FOR EcONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT (OECD), Paris 10 (1993).
4. Id. at 2.
5. Id. at 4.
6. Frances Williams, Markets Freed to Attract Investors, FIN. TIMES, Aug. 3, 1994
(quoting The United Nations fourth World Investment Report, while approaches to foreign
N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
multinationals needs to be matched by the assumption of greater social
responsibilities."7
The globalization of corporate governance standards is part of the
general globalization of markets8 that has world financial regulators
concerned.9 The recent collapse of Barings Futures (Singapore)"0 and
problems with Daiwa Bank" reinforced world-wide concerns regarding
oversight of an increasingly global financial system. Such incidents raise
questions as to whether some financial institutions and companies are
beyond the reach of the current regulatory structure. 2 In a recent speech,
Eddie George, governor of the Bank of England, told the Japanese
direct investment by governments has converged, it is "far from homogenous," which may
increase policy competition by different markets.) Id.
7. Id. The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (Unctad), drafter of
the report, "acknowledges that competition between countries to attract foreign investment
may tempt governments to cut social and labor standards-especially trade union rights-in
the hope of securing extra jobs and looks to multinational corporations to constantly
"reinvent" themselves, placing a premium on flexible and committed workforces." Frances
Williams, Global Business a Fact of Life, FIN. TIMES, Aug. 3, 1994, at 4.
8. Globalization of Capital and Corporate Governance, Remarks of Ko-Yung Tung,
Partner, O'Melveny & Myers, at the Symposium on Corporate Governance and Investor
Relations, Tokyo, Japan, (May 10, 1993) (on file with author).
9. See Jeffrey E. Garten, Restructuring Financial Services in the United States and
Japan, The Japan Society, 45-46, 1991 (on file with author).
10. See John Gapper & Nicholas Denton, Singapore Suggests Cover-ups From the Top,
FIN. TIMES, Oct. 18, 1995 at 8. (Barings Bank, a U.K. merchant banking group, was made
insolvent by massive trading losses incurred by its Singapore-based trading group.
Singapore and the U.K. authorities investigations are ongoing).
11. See Gerard Baker, Cover-up Claims Put Daiwa Managers In Dock, FIN. TIMES,
Weekend Ed., Oct. 21/22, 1995, at 3. A New York-based Daiwa trader incurred heavy
trading losses, allegedly covered up by Daiwa management. Id. U.S. authorities
announced a criminal indictment and ordered the Bank to close all U.S. operations, and
Japan's Finance Ministry announced more stringent oversight of banks "in a bid to
convince critics at home and abroad that past mistakes would not be repeated." Linda
Sieg, Japan To Beef Up Surveillance Of Its Banks, REUTERS, Dec. 26, 1995, available
in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Reuters News File.
12. Bronwen Maddox, Controls Need To Be Updated, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 6, 1995, at 19.
The article quotes a U.K. political columnist stating that "the arrival of a global free
market and the new information technologies ... [may] drive away power and authority
from the institutions that ran the old world, such as national governments," and a Bank for
International Settlements (BIS) report warning that "essentially local events may now have
disruptive implications for the international financial system as a whole." *Id. See also A
Survey of the World Economy: Who's in the Driving Seat? THE ECONOMIST, Oct. 7, 1995,
at 1-37; see also discussion infra part V.A.ILI. (technological advances as ongoing trends
influencing globalization of markets and corporate governance).
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Federation of Bankers' Associations, "[tjhese days it is not just banks or
credit institutions that have the capacity to cause systemic instability-nor
is the risk of systemic problems contained within national frontiers." 3
Portfolio diversification theories are causing U.S. institutional investors
to make increasingly significant investments abroad. 4 Although conscious
that "they are on unfamiliar cultural and legal ground,"' 5 such investors are
not leaving their agendas at home.16 Rather, they are using shareholder
activism to minimize the risks and costs of investing abroad. 7
This note summarizes developing global corporate governance
standards. After the summary provided in this Section, Section II discusses
the evolution of U.S. shareholder activism and applications in non-U.S.
markets. Section III discusses the California Public Employees Retirement
Fund (CalPERS) and its leadership role in the assertion of U.S.
shareholders' rights in non-U.S. markets. Section IV reviews how U.S.
activists and home market groups in various countries are building a global
focus on corporate governance. 18 Some of the significant local regulatory
responses to greater shareholder scrutiny of corporate accountability are
addressed.' 9
Section V sets forth current trends and hypothesizes their incremental
and extended impact. Ideally, chaos in the ongoing globalization of the
13. John Gapper, Bank Governor Sets Out New Rescue Principles, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 27,
1995, at 11. Mr. George told the group that the Bank of England is more reluctant to
participate in the rescue of groups like Barings Bank because "the degree of competition
between them and accountability to shareholders have increased," but emphasized that the
bank would step in to assist banks in situations where a collapse might set off an
international chain reaction. Id.
14. "Facilitated by a communications revolution and advanced risk management
techniques, the compelling case for portfolio diversification outweighs hesitance created
by 'riskier' foreign investment." 1H95 Capital Flows: Bonds Replace Equities as the
Mainstay for Foreign Investors, (Security Industry Association, An Analysis of Foreign
Participation in the U.S. Securities Markets), Oct. 1995, at 7.
15. James A. Fanto, The Transfonnation of French Corporate Governance and United
States Institutional Investors, 21 BROOK. INT'L L.J. 1, 25 (1995).
16. "... U.S.-style activism is going to spread - and quickly... " John Wilcox, Proxy
Predictions, INVESTOR RELATIONS MAGAZINE, Sept./Oct. 1991.
17. Id. These risks include: lack of liquidity or a market in which an investor cannot
manage its investment; market trading abuses; custodial and execution problems. Id.
18. These markets include Australia; the United Kingdom (U.K.); France; Japan; and
Germany and the Economic Community. [The terms European Community (EC), European
Economic Community (EEC), and European Union (EU) are often used interchangeably.
Other than in direct quotes, this note will hereinafter refer to the EC].
19. A full review of comparative regulation is beyond the scope of this note.
1997]
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capital markets will be ordered slowly, and effective self regulation will
develop through a process of education, participation, competition and
practice by worldwide corporate and investment market participants. These
participants face heightened scrutiny by regulators, investors, the media and
the general public, as they develop and refine standards of corporate
governance which will allow them to compete for the attention of
international investors. These standards and practices will take shape as
they are rewarded or punished in the marketplace and competitively
imitated.
It is the conclusion of this note in Section VI that the interests of all
market participants will be better served by self regulation, which
represents a flexible response to market conditions. Corporate managers
hold it within their power to minimize the prospects of intrusive regulation
by engaging in meaningful self-regulation with respect to corporate
governance.
Anglo American systems of corporate governance, such as those of the
U.S. and the U.K., are generally characterized by listed, liquid stock
markets and dispersed shareownership,a where control can be wrested from
management. 2' Historically, this approach to corporate governance has
been more confrontational, relying on competing pressures and divisions
of responsibility to drive performance.22
Non-Anglo American systems of Continental Europe are built on a
small number of stocks trading in illiquid markets where large shareholders
dominate and no "takeover market" exists for control of companies.23
Japanese and German models are also historically characterized by
dominant shareholders and the lack of an effective takeover market.24
20. Fund Urges Europe Corporate Reform, REUTERS, Sept.6, 1995, available in
LEXIS, Nexis Library, Reuters News File. Fund manager Albert Morillo of Scottish
Widows, the fifth-largest money manager in the U.K., differentiates "outsider" and
"insider" systems of corporate governance. "The outsider system, practiced largely in the
U.K. and the U.S., is characterized by lots of quoted stocks, liquid stock markets and well
dispersed ownership. Corporate control can be achieved and reined away from
management." Id.
21. Id.
22. Tony Strachan, The Governance and Role of Business Corporations in a Modem
Society, An essay on a Ditchley Foundation Conference, Ditchley Conference Report No.
D92/5, (May 1992) (on file with author).
23. Fund Urges Europe Corporate Reform, REUTERS, Sept. 6, 1995, available in
LEXIS, Nexis Library, Reuters File. Fund manager Morillo defines "insider" systems as
"[B]uilt on a small number of stocks and relatively illiquid markets where ownership and
control are not frequently traded and there is a high concentration of shareholders," and
characterizes Continental European systems as "insider" systems. Id.
24. See discussion infra parts IV; C, D and F. See also Howard Sherman, Comparative
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These systems are generally based on a more "consensual" approach.25
Progress is slow, but the trend among the major markets is quite clearly
towards a more Anglo-American style corporate governance.26
For a corporate entity operating in any market, the board must
determine corporate strategy, monitor its implementation, and when
required, take appropriate steps to correct or change management.2 7 Given
differences in the composition of boards and the level of involvement
shareholders are afforded in various markets, no global standard of practice
to fulfill these functions has emerged.28
Against this backdrop, domestic shareholder groups are either
springing up or maturing in markets around the world, often supported by
"increasingly active (and largely U.S.-based) global institutions., 29 Public
interest is rising as press reports offer "tips from analysts and shareholder
rights activists on holder friendly policies that boost share prices.',
30
Models of Privatization: Paradigms And Politics, 21 BROOK. J.INT'L L. 79, 81 (1995).
The French core shareholder structure parallels the control of the banks in
Germany and Switzerland, and . . . Japan. These closely controlled systems
have many benefits. They foster relationship investing, allow for long-term
planning, and put expertise from related companies in the hands of
management. In many ways the United States is trying to modify our corporate
governance system to enjoy these and other benefits of European and Japanese
systems.
Telephone interview with Howard Sherman, Senior Vice President and Global Director,
Institutional Shareholder Services, (Jan. 18, 1996) [Hereinafter Sherman interview].
25. Strachan, supra note 22.
26. Sherman interview, supra note 24.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Martin Dickson, Governance Goes Global - The Spread of Shareholder A ctivism,
FIN. TIMES, Sept. 13, 1994, at 14. See generally Martin Dickson, Shareholder Revolt,
BUSINESS WEEK, Sept. 18, 1995, at 60-64.
30. Margaret Studer, Shareholders Must Work to Maximize Investments in European
Companies, THE WALL ST. J., Aug. 21, 1995 at A5E. The general tips offered are: no
investments in companies with limitations on voting rights; maximum flow of information;
and general dividend payout levels offered from a sector analysis. Id. The perspective
reflected is that of general U.S. governance expectations.
19971
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H. U.S. SHAREHOLDER ACTIVISM
AND EVOLVING GLOBAL APPLICATIONS
A. Historical Development of Governance Standards
And Shareholder Activism
U.S. corporate governance has been structured in attempt to ensure the
accountability of management and boards to shareholders while share
ownership has become increasingly diffuse and separated from control.3
Prior to 1933, the federal government routinely left corporate practices to
the states, despite infrequent suggestions that a federal corporation law be
developed.32 Congressional hearings during the Great Depression following
the 1929 market crash revealed corporate indifference to shareholders.33
Congress was unwilling to tread on traditional state primacy in regulating
corporate governance, and responded with legislation requiring the
disclosure of information to investors.34 Specifically, disclosure was
required when a public corporation issued stock to the public, and on an
on-going periodic basis thereafter. 5 Shortly after its inception the
Securities and Exchange Commission [hereinafter SEC] was delegated
power to regulate proxy solicitations in response to Congress' realization
that lack of information typically rendered shareholder votes meaningless,
despite shareholders' state law voting rights. 36 The current U.S. conception
of corporate governance arose in the 1970's in response to a perception of
management entrenchment and takeover abuses in corporate America.37
31. See generally A. A. Sommer, Jr., Corporate Governance: The Search for Solutions,
26 U.S.F. L. REV. 695 (1992). The article covers the development of U.S. market
regulations, the switch from disperse share ownership to concentration of ownership among
large institutional shareholders, activism differences among types of institutional investors,
suggestions for rethinking the U.S. corporate governance model, and concludes that efforts
to better align the interests of shareholders and management can only serve to increase
U.S. competitiveness in an increasingly global competitive field. Id.
32. Id. See also Roberta Karmel, Is It Time For A Federal Corporation Law? 57
BROOK. L.REV. 55, 76 (1991).
33. Id. See generally ROBERT A. G. MONKS & NELL MINOW, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
(1995).
34. Id.
35. Sommer, supra note 31, at 701.
36. "Congress believed that if shareholders were given more information concerning
issues and directorial candidates they would be able to use their voting rights intelligently
and effectively to control management and thus create a new means of accomplishing
accountability." Id.
37. Warren Grienenberger, Institutional Shareholders and Corporate Governance, 875
(Vol. 17626
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Studies, debates and legislative proposals were undertaken, leading to a
recognition of "corporate governance" as a distinct and important element
of investing.38 Shareholder activism evolved in the 1980's as different
types of shareholder groups formed coalitions to sponsor social
responsibility resolutions, with investment in South Africa as a dominant
issue.39
B. Shareholder Activism Today
Activism in the United States has changed dramatically from the social
policy corporate governance initiatives of the 1980's.40 "Prior to 1987,
[activists] . ..had all been gadflies or groups other than institutional
investors.",4' Today, institutional investors are the most important
shareholder activists, and their focus typically is on corporate
performance. Many factors converged to effect this change, including an
overwhelming growth of institutional investment in corporate America, and
an increase in passive 41 investment techniques."
PLI Corp. 355, at 1 (1995). See also Sommer, supra note 31, at 6.
38. Warren Grienenberger, Institutional Shareholders and Corporate Governance, 875
PLI Corp. 355, I.A.2 (1995).
39. How Institutions Voted On Social Responsibility Shareholder Resolutions in the
1988 Proxy Season, INVESTOR RESPONSIBILITY RESEARCH CENTER SOCIAL ISSUE SERVICE, SepL
1988, at 3.
40. Martin Dickson, Investors Wake Up to Their Power, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 3, 1990, at
18.
41. Interview with John C. Wilcox, FIN. EXECUTIVE J., THE NASDAQ STOCK MARKET,
Vol.1, No.1, May/June 1991, at 6.
42. id.
43. "'Index managers' are those using passive investment techniques, generally
matching an index such as the Standard & Poor's [hereinafter S&P] 500." Glossary of
Terms, Investor Relations Analytical Services, Georgeson & Company Capabilities
Brochure (1995). "'Quantitative' (investment) managers base their buying decisions entirely
on computer-driven screening strategies; 'Qualitative' (investment) managers include
qualitative factors and human input in their decision making process, although they may
also use quantitative models for initial screening." Id.
44. Dickson, supra note 40, at 18. Using these techniques, investors build a portfolio
of stocks weighted to mimic a market index such as the Standard & Poor's [hereinafter
S&P] 500 or the E.A.F.E. (Europe, Australiasia-Far East) Index. Cost efficiency and the
fact that few investment managers can outperform broad market indices over the long term
are cited as rationales for the technique. But the longer term investment time frames of
indexed investments gives an investment manager an incentive to monitor management
more closely. Id. See also Joel Chernoff, More Finns Cross Borders, PENSIONS &
INVESTMENTS, March 6, 1995, p. 14. "Use of passive management by continental European
6271997]
N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
The hostile takeovers of the 1980's led to the creation of an arsenal
of management defenses to corporate takeovers and bust-ups.45 Lingering
fears that some incompetent corporate managers could use these defenses
as a shield, or to line their own pockets, have combined with a deep
concern about American competitiveness in the face of overseas
competition, adding weight to activism efforts by institutional investors.46
The 1990's have been dubbed "the decade of retribution," and hold
heightened planning challenges for corporate entities: public attitudes are
unsympathetic; government regulations are increasing; and the environment
is increasingly litigious.47 Corporate performance and management
monitoring have become the hallmarks of U.S. corporate governance
activism in the '90s, and a new activist era in corporate boardrooms has
begun.48 Activists have gained power and respectability, shifting their
focus from opposition to management anti-takeover devices to the long-
term improvement of corporate performance.49
pension funds is ... on the rise."
45. See, e.g., Bevis Longstreth, Reflections on the State of Corporate Governance, 57
BROOK. L. REV. 113 (1991).
The central problem with our present system of corporate governance has been
the loss of confidence on the part of shareholders in the willingness of even
outside directors to act in the shareholders' best interests when confronted with
a loss to control, either through a hostile takeover bid or a proxy contest. This
loss of confidence is sometimes justified, but not because outside directors act
improperly. The problem is a structural one: we have allowed state law ... to
classify outside directors, voting in such extreme circumstances, as
"disinterested," therefore entitling them to the robust protection of the business
judgement rule.
Id. at 120. A proper discussion of the business judgement rule and a comparative analysis
is beyond the scope of this note. Despite our myriad of legislation, regulation and case law,
the standard applied to scrutinize board actions during a change in control continues to take
shape. U.S. commentators argue the standard to be inferred from the Paramount-QVC-
Viacom takeover battle provides fuzzy guidance to directors and no direct input or voice
for shareholders. Paramount Communications Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., Del. Sup.Ct. No.
427, 1993 and 428, 1993 (Consolidated, 12/9/93). See, e.g., Proposed Merger's Shift of
Voting Power Subjects Directors Decision to Enhanced Scrutiny, " BNA's Corporate
Counsel Weekly, Vol.8, No. 48, Dec. 15 (1993), at 8; see also John Pound, Where
ShareholderActivism is Paramount, WALL ST. J., Dec. 7, 1993, at A16.
46. Janet Bush, A merican Institutions Exercise Some Muscle, FIN. TIMES, May 5, 1989,
at 27.
47. See Memorandum from Harvey L. Pitt & Matt T. Morley, Fried, Frank, Harris &
Jacobson, to clients, Corporate Introspection in the Nineties: "To Thine Own Self Be True"
Client (Dec. 7, 1992) (on file with author).
48. Paul Ingrassia, Memo to Board: Management Isn 'tA lways Wrong, ASIAN WALL ST.
J. Nov. 24, 1994, at 6.
49. BNA's Corporate Counsel Weekly, Investor Tactics Change as Focus Sharpens on
[Vol. 17
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Institutional investors, not regulators or legislators, are the prime
movers of the current governance agenda. 50  Outside directors and
Improvement of Long-term Corporate Performance, Vol. 8, No. 43, Nov 10 (1993) at 6-8.
50. Warren F. Grienenberger, Institutional Shareholders and Corporate Governance, 875
PLI Corp 355, (1995), at V.B. "These investors are worried lest they be charged with
dereliction of their fiduciary duties to the beneficiaries whose money they manage. Since
they are no longer able to make a graceful exit from disappointing investments, they will
use their available time and energy to push for corporate change." Id.
Familiarity with the numerous institutional investor services, lobbying groups and
gadflies affecting the U.S. corporate governance debate is useful. Several are identified
below:
The Investor Responsibility Research Center, [hereinafter IRRC], "was founded in
1972 as an independent, not-for-profit corporation to conduct research and publish impartial
reports on contemporary social and public policy issues and the impact of those issues on
major corporations and international investors." IRRC statement in CORPORATE CONFLICTS:
PROXY FIGHTS IN THE 1980'S, RONALD E. SCHRAGER, IRRC, (1986).
The Council of Institutional Investors [hereinafter CII], a Washington D.C. Center
for shareholder rights activists founded in 1986, Michael Ybarra, Money Talks, CAL.
LAWYER, 15 FEB CAL. LAW. 50 (1995), represents government and union pension funds, and
publishes an annual list of underperforming companies. Michael Quint, Pension Group
Lists 50 Companies as Financial Laggards, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8, 1993, at D3. Management
teams of several companies included on the list, announced at a CII meeting in New York
on October 2, 1995, have acknowledged and taken steps to explain poor financial
performance and corporate strategies to improve. Several indicated recent improvements
in share price, or the efforts of new Chief Executive Officers (New CEOs were in place
of about half the companies listed). CORPORATE GOVERNANCE HIGHLIGHTS, IRRC, Vol. 6, No.
43, at 91. The Council's members have been successful in using the target list, or their
own lists, to urge board members or management to negotiate privately rather than face
a public resolution at the annual meeting. Joann S. Lublin, Pension Funds Take A im at
Weak Stocks, THE WALL ST. J., Oct. 2, 1995, at A4.
Global Proxy Services Corporation (hereinafter GPSC manages corporate governance
activities and exercises voting rights for institutional investors with holdings of over $200
billion U.S. dollars in corporate securities in over fifty markets. Automatic Data Processing
Press Release, Sept. 24, 1996. Automatic Data Processing acquired processing operations
of GPSC.
Institutional Shareholder Services [hereinafter ISS) is a Washington based proxy
voting and corporate governance advisory firm, which also provides voting, information
and consulting services to pension funds, investment managers and global custody banks.
The group issues voting guidelines based on its proxy analyses which clients use in
fulfillment of fiduciary obligations to vote proxies. Clients use the guideline
recommendations either as a basis for their voting decision, or as they consider their voting
decision. Institutional Shareholder Services Promotional material: Service Benefits (on file
with author).
United Shareholders Association [hereinafter U.S.A], formed as a shareholder
advocacy group by T. Boone Pickens in 1986. Kevin Salwen, Holders Group Formed by
Pickens Says It Will FoldA t YearEnd, THE ASIAN WALL ST. J., Oct. 27, 1993, at 13. U.S.A.
closed down operations in 1993 declaring its mission of providing a voice to individual
N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
management are increasingly willing to negotiate directly with
shareholders, and activist investors have persuaded boards to oust over a
dozen CEOs of major U.S. corporations since 1992." 1
Corporate pension funds, traditionally sympathetic to the plights of
management, have started to join the governance debate. 52 The Campbell
Soup Company announced in 1993 that it planned to tell its various money
managers to vote proxies for the firm's corporate retirement plan against
companies that do not follow certain basic corporate governance
principles.53 To a lesser extent, private pension fund managers have also
joined the fray of shareholder activism.54
shareholders, stirring national debate on shareholder rights and corporate governance, and
reform of proxy rules as "ninety percent complete." IRRC, Corporate Governance
Highlights, Vol. 4, No. 48, at 1. Among U.S.A.'s accomplishments during its seven year
tenure: building a grassroots base of thirty-nine local chapters; annual activism campaign
coordination resulting in 1508 shareholder proposals at seventy companies; campaigns
generating 100,000 letters and telegrams to state legislatures, Congress, the White House
and the SEC on various shareholder related issues. Id. The Proxy Rules were changed in
1992, loosening restrictions on communications between U.S. institutional investors. See
generally The New SEC Rules: Proxy Reform: A New Era of SEC Activism, INSIGHTS,
Vol. 6 No. 11, Nov. 11, 1992, at 2-12. U.S.A.'s president Ralph Whitworth stated that
while the group had considered becoming a "watchdog organization conducting corporate
activism" it viewed taking on such a role as "not constructive ... [w]e don't want to be
another Washington paper tiger trumping up stories of hell and damnation and offering
false promises of salvation, feeding off our membership." lead. IRRC, Corporate
Governance Highlights, Vol. 4, No. 48, at 1. While many investment community
participants viewed U.S.A as "low budget gadfly and publicity machine," its publicity
campaigns were effective. To avoid appearing on the group's target list, many U.S.
companies changed board structure or voting mechanisms. Salwen, supra, at 13.
51. ISS SPECIAL REPORT, THE 1994 PRoXY SEASON: SHAREHOLDERS MAIrAIN THEIR EDGE, at
7.
52. "Currently, many plan managers leave [proxy] voting to their money managers..
[who] often are seeking additional business from corporate clients and don't want to
anger the corporate community with votes against management." Kevin G. Salwen &
Leslie Scism, Corporate Pensions Face Proxy Rules, WALL ST. J., Dec. 14, 1993, at Cl. The
article discusses Clinton administration drafting of plans to encourage corporate pension
funds to set procedures to govern proxy voting. Id. Since then, the Department of Labor
[hereinafter DOL] has issued Interpretive Bulletin 94-2, offering guidance on proxy voting
and shareholder activism by pension plans governed by ERISA. See infra discussion part
II.B.1.
53. Susan Pulliam, Campbell Soup's Pension Fund Plans to Play A ctivist-Holder Role,
ASIAN WALL ST.J., July 16, 1993, at 9. John Pound of Harvard University believes that
other corporate pension funds will follow, spreading the U.S. shareholder-rights movement:
"It's absolutely inevitable that corporate pension funds will need to take more active
positions ... [t]he visibility of these issues is such that you can't sit by and do nothing."
Id.
54. Susan Pulliam, Big U.S. Investors Grow More Assertive: Even Money Managers
[Vol. 17
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1. Department of Labor Guidelines on the Fiduciary Duties of Public
Pension Fund Administrators to Vote Non-U.S. Shares
In 1988, the U.S. Department of Labor [hereinafter DOL] issued the
"Avon letter," which stated that the Employee Retirement Income Security
Act of 1975 [hereinafter ERISA] requires fiduciaries to exercise their
proxy-voting responsibilities." Many institutions not subject to ERISA's
minimum federal standards for private pension funds also attempted to
comply.
56
U.S. investors, who had been unsure whether the same standard
applied to voting foreign proxies, got "a strong nudge . . . in the right
direction" from the Assistant Secretary for Pension and Welfare Benefits,
Olena Berg, in 1994.57 The DOL urged investment managers to make
Join Public Efforts for Changes at Lagging Firms, THE ASIAN WALL ST. J. Feb. 10, 1993 at
14.
55. IRRC, WRITING PROXY VOTING GUIDELINES: A HANDBOOK FOR INSTrTUTIONAL INvESTORS,
app. A, at 1-6 (1990).
56. Id.
57. See, e.g., Olena Berg, Assistant Secretary of Labor, remarks at the Institutional
Shareholder Services, Inc. 1994 Annual Conference, (Feb. 4, 1994) [Hereinafter Berg
Speech]. See also Labor Dept. to Funds: Vote Global Proxies, IRRC Global Shareholder
(Spring 1994) at 1, 7-9 and 31. In response to a letter questioning the standard for voting
foreign proxies by the IRRC, Berg responded:
It is our view that the same principles apply ... [h]owever, because the rules
under which most foreign securities markets operate are not as clear as those
applicable to the United States securities market, and because there are often
additional costs involved in receiving and translating proxy material, a prudent
fiduciary would have to factor into a decision to purchase a foreign security
whether the inability or difficulty to vote on corporate issues is reflected in the
market price for the security ... the plan fiduciary would have to evaluate the
cost of voting the shares against the potential value to the plan of voting the
shares.
Id. at 8.
Expanding on how investors can evaluate this cost benefit approach to voting foreign
proxies during an interview with IRRC staffers, Berg said if "you're getting value back but
not being able to exercise that right of ownership, then maybe you should look at that
before you make the international investment." Id. at 7.
The DOL makes explicit the fact that a fiduciary may choose not to vote if the
fiduciary does not believe the cost justifies the assertion of voting rights. Debevoise and
Plimpton, Memorandum to Our Clients and Friends: DOL Revisits Pension Proxy Voting,
Aug. 3, 1994. On determining whether value outweighs cost, the letter adds "It is unclear,
at least to U.S., how one would ever know." Id. Berg has served on the boards of activist
funds CalSTERS and CaIPERS, and intends to use her position as a "bully pulpit" to
encourage active, committed investing by public pension funds. Berg Speech, at 9-10.
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certain considerations before investing abroad.58 Berg suggested they
assess whether investments abroad would involve ownership of non-voting
stock or shares subject to voting rights restrictions, as well as plan
administrators' lack of familiarity or agreement with local corporate
governance practices.59 The DOL's requirement that shares be voted is
based upon a cost-benefit assessment, and plan administrators are urged to
consider these issues when determining whether the benefits of investing
abroad outweigh the costs.
60
Berg indicated that voting may not always be the most appropriate
method to exercise ownership rights.61 When an investment is significant,
active monitoring 61 of management might be appropriate if the fiduciary
"concludes that there is a reasonable expectation that such monitoring
would enhance the plan's net return on its investment. '63 In the past,
active monitoring might not have had an impact, and thus would not be
considered prudent by a plan trustee. 64 The prudence standard65 is the
central tenet of trust law,66 and requires that trustees adapt their activities
to reflect changes in circumstances.67 The impact now possible through
activism is one example of a change in circumstances.68
58. See e.g., Berg Speech, supra note 57. See also Labor Dept. to Funds: Vote Global
Proxies, IRRC GLOBAL SHAREHOLDER (Spring 1994) at 1, 7-9 and 31.
59. Id. at 7.
60. Labor Dept. to Funds: Vote Global Proxies, IRRC GLOBAL SHAREHOLDER, Spring 1994,
at 7. As this note goes to press, the SEC is launching a probe to examine the problems
faced by U.S. shareholders as they try to vote their shares in non U.S. companies. The
probe is in response to complaints by shareholders. Global Proxy Watch, The Newsletter
of International Corporate Governance and Shareholder Value, vol. 1, No. 18, May 9, 1997,
p.'.
61. Id. at 7-9.
62. 'Active monitoring refers to analysis of management and company specific
fundamentals and performance.
63. Berg Speech, supra note 57, "Such monitoring could take many forms, such as
ongoing dialogues with corporate management, working actively to secure independent
directors on the board, review of the corporation's investment in training to develop its
workforce, or monitoring of management's long term business plans." Id. at 16.
64. Sarah Teslik, On Beyond Proxy Voting (With Apologies to Dr. Seuss), 866 PLI
Corp 809 (1994).
65. Id. "'Trustees' central obligation, then, is to care carefully for someone else's
property. Lawyers don't want to say "care carefully" so they call this obligation






Shortly after Berg's statements on the issue, the DOL published
Interpretive Bulletin 94-1,69 providing affirmation that ERISA plan
managers responsibilities "includ(e) voting proxies on matters which may
affect the value of a plan's stock., 70 At the same time, the DOL issued
"The Road to High-Performance Workplaces" for plan managers and other
corporate stakeholders, to "reflect what we have learned from the unsung
heroes of the American Workplace-that high-performance workplaces
offer great benefits for workers, managers, companies, unions, and the
economy as a whole.'
U.S. labor unions are increasingly finding a voice in corporate
governance and sponsoring shareholder proposals that often mirror reforms
sought by public pension plan activists. 72 Labor proposals push a union
agenda that disturbs corporate management and traditional U.S. shareholder
activists. 73 Non-U.S. corporate governance models that include greater labor
participation have been offered as a model for analysis of the strengths and
weaknesses of U.S. corporations.
74
69. Title 29 Chapter XXV - Pension and Welfare Benefits Administration, Department
of Labor, Part 2509 - Interpretive Bulletins Relating to the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act of 1974.
70. Id.
71. Department of Labor Press Release, July 28, 1994, Secretary Reich Advocates
Corporate Activist Role for Pension Plans. The release referred to High-Performance
Workplaces: Implicationsforlnvestment Research andA ctive Investing Strategies, A report
prepared by the Gordon Group for CalPERS. The report provides empirical evidence and
examples of the contribution to productivity and profitability of good employment
practices. Id.
72. See Leslie Scism, Labor Unions Increasingly Initiate Proxy Proposals, WALL ST. J.,
Mar. 1, 1994, at Cl. Proposals come from both trustees managing union members pension
money and active or retired union members who typically hold their stock through
corporate stock purchase programs. Id. See also ISS SPECIAL REPORT THE 1994 PROXY
SEASON: SHAREHOLDERS MAINTAIN THEIR EDGE, at 8, and 1995 Annual Meeting Season Wrap-
Up: Corporate Governance, Georgeson & Company, Inc. 1995. Available at
http://www.georgeson.com. 'The 1995 season saw an 85% increase in governance-related
shareholder proposals ... [t]here was a significant increase in proposals sponsored by
labor unions, which jumped to forty-eight proposals in 1995 from thirty-two in 1994." Id.
73. See Scism, supra note 72, at Cl.
74. See Institutional Owners and Corporate Managers: A Comparative Perspective, 57
BROOK. L. REV. 97, 98 (1991). See, e.g., discussion of inclusion of labor representatives
on supervisory boards in Germany, infra part IV, and discussion of corporate oustings in
France due to work stoppages infra, part IV.C. See also Howard Sherman, Comparative
Models of Privatization: Paradigms And Politics, 21 BROOK. J.INT'L L. 79, 81 (1995).
The French core shareholder structure parallels the control of the banks in
Germany and Switzerland, and ...Japan. These closely controlled systems
have many benefits. They foster relationship investing, allow for long-term
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IlH. CALIFORNIA PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' RETIREMENT SYSTEM (CALPERS), As
GLOBAL GADFLY, TAKES
U.S. STYLE ACTIVISM ABROAD
A. CalPERS Goals And Methods.
California Public Employee's Retirement System [hereinafter
CalPERS], the pension fund for public employees of the State of
California, claims to be the largest pension fund in the United States, and
the third largest pension fund in the world.75 CaIPERS has been a leader
in the U.S. shareholder rights movement,76 thus, it is useful to review the
evolution of its activist techniques over the past decade in considering how
activism will evolve in non-U.S. markets.
1. Evolution of CalPERS' U.S. Activism.
CalPERS maintains that its sheer size creates a situation where
CalPERS' investment managers could not sell or buy stocks without having
a material adverse effect on the value of their shares.77 CalPERS' stake is
typically too large to allow a sell-off of significant holdings without
causing a drop in share price. 8 This limit on the ability to sell shares has
the effect of making CalPERS a permanent shareholder.7 9
Given its duty to minimize risk and maximize returns for investors,
CalPERS' exerts influence without the immediate threat of divestment.
CalPERS employs passive investment decision making techniques80
coupled with activist assertions of fundamental shareholder rights, thereby
influencing corporate boards to improve overall returns.8
planning, and put expertise from related companies in the hands of
management. In many ways the United States is trying to modify our corporate
governance system to enjoy these and other benefits of European and Japanese
systems.
Id.
75. California Public Employees' Retirement System (CalPERS) Fact Sheet, (on file
with author).
76. Dickson, supra note 40, at 18.







CalPERS activism changed significantly in 1989 with a shift in focus
from anti-takeover issues to issues of corporate performance.82 CalPERS
wrote to the SEC, which ultimately resulted in the 1992 reform of
executive compensation disclosure and proxy solicitation rules.83
CalPERS defines corporate governance as "the prudent exercise of
ownership rights, toward the goal of increased share value, '4 and prefers
behind-the-scenes negotiations over use of the media and U.S. proxy
machinery. However, CalPERS will use all available tools, including
threatened and actual litigation, if discussions do not work.85 CalPERS
rarely needs to rely on public threats any longer.86 In 1994, all of the
corporations on CalPERs target list (a roster of companies deemed to be
performing poorly) agreed to allow CalPERS to "meet with outside
directors to assess their ability and inclination to act independently.""
Given greater corporate willingness to listen to its' views, CalPERS has
adopted a less confrontational approach.88 CEO James Burton stated, "In
82. Memorandum from the CalPERS Legal Office to Members of the Investment
Community (Aug. 14, 1995) (on file with author).
83. Memorandum from the CalPERS Legal Office to Members of the Investment
Community (Aug. 14, 1995) (on file with author).
These rule changes recognized, for the first time, that the investor community
has changed from what it was when the SEC was created and the proxy rules
first developed-passive institutions, rather than individuals, arbitrageurs or
firms whose goal is to take over the management of a company, are now the
predominant investor.
Id.; See generally 17 C.F.R.§ 240.14a-2(b)(1993).
84. Memorandum from the CalPERS Legal Office to Members of the Investment
Community (Aug. 14, 1995) at 174, (on file with author). Compare note 1, supra
(definition of corporate governance).
85. Dickson, supra note 40, at 18. The article discusses the division of interests, with
many corporate managers complaining that institutional investors know too little about the
company's they invest in to add meaningfully to corporate decision making, have too short
term a focus, and are quick to sell out at a premium in change of control transactions.
Hanson's offered CalPERS 10 percent annual portfolio turnover in rebuttal. Id. at page 4
of Westlaw. But see, James A. White, CalPERS' Chief Wields Big Stick for Institutional
Shareholders, WALL ST.J., Apr. 3, 1990, at Cl, in which Dale Hanson maintains that as
fiduciary for beneficiaries with few options other than holding shares for decades, CalPERS
seeks not to run companies, but to maintain periodic contact with directors. "It's the care
and feeding of stockholders; if a company has large stockholders, it's much better to know
them" before problems occur. Id.
86. CaPERS Enjoys Improved Access to Directors at Targeted Companies, BNA's
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1987, major corporations didn't even answer our phone calls... [n]ow it's
no longer necessary to strong arm them but we still need to be as vigilant
and, if need be, as forceful in pursuing our program goals." 89
CaIPERS believes that its activism has produced a statistically
significant and positive effect on share price performance of targeted
companies.9" This has been termed the "CalPERS Effect" by Wilshire
Associates, an advisory firm that was commissioned by CalPERS to study
the economic impact of its activist initiatives."
While CalPERS has arrived at an established approach to U.S.
governance issues, its strategy in non-U.S. markets has yet to be
determined.92 At the International Monetary Conference in June 1995,
89. Id.
90. Memorandum from the CalPERS Legal Office to Members of the Investment
Community (Aug. 14, 1995)(Attachment B) at 165 (on file with author) .The attachment
includes two studies completed for CalPERS by Wilshire Associates: Steven L. Nesbitt,
Long-Term Rewards From Shareholder A ctivism: A Study of the "CalPERS Effect," J. OF
APPLIED CORP. FIN. (Winter 1994); and The "CaJPERS Effect": A Corporate Governance
Update, July 19, 1995, by Stephen L. Nesbitt of Wilshire Associates.
91. Memorandum from the CalPERS Legal Office to Members of the Investment
Community (Aug. 14, 1995)(Attachment B) at 165 (on file with author). The attachment
includes two studies completed for CalPERS by Wilshire Associates: Steven L. Nesbitt,
Long-Term Rewards From Shareholder Activism: A Study of the "CalPERS Effect", J.
OF APPLIED CORP. FIN. (Winter 1994); Stephen L. Nesbitt of Wilshire Associates, The
"CalPERS Effect": A Corporate Governance Update, July 19, 1995. The first examined
performance by forty-two CalPERS target companies between 1987 and 1992, and
concluded that on average these firms, which had trailed the S&P 500 Index by 66% in
the five years prior to being targeted, outperformed the index by 41.3% for the five years
following their targeting. An updated study, including results for targeted companies
which had not had five full years of completed history in the prior report, indicated an
increase in the group's return averaging 52.5%. Id. at 78.
92. Memorandum from the CalPERS Legal Office to Members of the Investment
Community (Aug. 14, 1995) (at 145) (on file with author).
". .. [W]e need to know more about the legal rights that are available to
shareholders in other countries: the capital ownership structures; what
governance activities are emerging from within, rather than outside, other
countries; and the cultural motivators that impact corporate behavior. While we
continue to believe that international corporate governance has the same
analytical validity as a domestic program, we do not yet know how best to use
corporate governance to add value in these other countries."
Id.
CalPERS has no goal to establish a cookie cutter approach to corporate governance.
Approaches in various markets need to be tailored to cultural and market conditions.
R. 17.1.4. Telephone interview with Kayla Gillan, Deputy General Counsel, CalPERS, (Jan.
18, 1996). [Hereinafter Gillan interview.] Since this note was written, CalPERS has set
guidelines for U.K. and French governance, and expects to issue similar guidance for Japan
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CalPERS CEO, James Burton, announced an intent to launch a campaign
to target poorly performing companies overseas.93 CalPERS has also been
talking with European funds looking to take a more active approach to
their investments. 94 In 1995, CalPERS announced plans to increase its
international allocation from 12 to 20% of assets, and to participate in the
formation of the International Corporate Governance Organization.95
CalPERS has stated that "shareholder activism improves economic
returns in the U.S." There is no reason to believe that similar results are
not possible globally. The investment world is looking to CalPERS to
exercise leadership in this area."'96 CalPERS' Board of Administration
president, William Crist, has reassured non-U.S. markets that CalPERS will
look to local markets for lessons on how best to assert its rights as a
shareholder of non-U.S. companies.97
CalPERS initiatives in various non-U.S. markets are discussed below,
within the context of each market.
and Germany by the end of 1997. Focus - CalPERS sets U.K., French governance
guidelines, REUTERS, March 27, 1997, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Reuters News
File.
93. Pension Fund Taking Corporate Campaign Overseas, REUTERS, June 7, 1995
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Reuters News File. Burton added that the campaign
will focus on the poorest relative performers among the fund's international investments.
Id.
94. John Gapper, CalPERS to Track Foreign Groups, FIN. TIMES, Jun. 8, 1995, at 27.
95. Memorandum from the CalPERS Legal Office to Members of the Investment
Community (Aug. 14, 1995)(Attachment A) at 154 (on file with author). The attachment
contains a Memorandum from Richard Koppes to the Members of the Board of
Administration (Aug. 1, 1995). The Organization's formation meeting was held in
conjunction with the annual Council of Institutional Investors meeting. Id.
"... [T]he United States Council of Institutional Investors is now working with
its counterparts in London and throughout Europe and Australia to form what
they're calling the International Corporate Governance Organization (ICGO).
The ICGO is meant to be a clearinghouse for local market standards of conduct
and governance procedures. It could also become a conduit for cross-border
shareholder initiatives."
Howard Sherman, Symposium - Comparative Models of Privatization: Paradigms And
Politics, 21 Brook.J.Int'l L. 79, 81 (1995).
Since then, the group has been renamed the International Corporate Governance
Network (ICGN). Sherman interview, supra note 24.
96. Id., Memorandum from the CalPERS Legal Office to Members of the Investment
Community (Aug. 14, 1995), Attachment E, at 196 (on file with author).
97. William Lewis, CalPERS Reassures City Over Tactics, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 13, 1995,
at 20.
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IV. RECENT EXAMPLES OF NON-U.S.
HOME MARKET GADFLIES EMPLOYING
U.S.-STYLE SHAREHOLDER ACnvIsM TECHNIQUES
A. European Community (EC) Guidelines
on Corporate Governance
1. Report on Common Corporate Governance Aspirations For Member
States-Center for European Studies, Brussels
The fact that France, Germany, and the U.K., all members of the EC,
exhibit structural and practical differences in their corporate governance
approaches complicates the EC's mission to harmonize rather than to
standardize.98 In June of 1995, the Center for European Policy Studies
[hereinafter CEPS] issued a proposed code of best practice for EC
corporate governance. 99 The basic rule of the Guidelines of Best Practice
offered by CEPS is that "a corporate governance system should aim at
achieving a consensus among its principal participants."'" Its three-
pronged approach to policy recommendations addresses: areas to be further
98. Much has been written on the EC as it struggles toward harmonization, and a full
review of that process is beyond the scope of this note. See, e.g., David Charny,
Competition Among Jurisdictions In Formulation Corporate Law Rules: A n A merican
Perspective on the "Race To The Bottom "In The European Communities, 32 HARV. INT'L.
L.J. 423 (1991); Ethan Schwartz, Politics As Usual: The History Of European Community
Merger Control, 18 YALE J. INT'L L. 607 (1993); James D. Cox, Nis Jul Clausen, The
Monitoring Duties Of Directors Under the EC Directives: A View From The United States
Experience, 2 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 29 (1992); Alfred F. Conrad, The European
Alternative To Uniformity In Corporations Laws, 89 MICH.L.REV. 2150 (1991); Jonathan
S. Chester, The Proposed Regulation of Corporate Tender Offers In The European
Community, 12 N.Y.L. SCH. J.INT'L COMP. L., 481 (1991); Barbara Hoecklin, European
Company Statute: Company Structure And Employee Involvement A cross EC Borders, 16
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 587 (1991); Manning Gilbert Warren III, Global
Harmonization of Securities Laws: The Achievements of The European Communities, 31
HARV.Int'l L.J. 185 (1990); Daniel M. Keim, The European Community's Proposed
Directive On Takeover Bids And Its Impact On Shareholders' Rights, 16 BROOK. J. INT'L.
L. 561 (1990); Benjamin T. Lo, Improving Corporate Governance: Lessons From The
European Community, IND. J.GLB'L. L. ST. (1993).
99. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN EUROPE, CENTER FOR EUROPEAN POLICY STUDIES, (CEPS)
Working Party Report No. 12, (June, 1995). The report was prepared to "stimulate debate
and to serve as a background paper for the conclusions [offered], and recommends
harmonization of financial reporting and takeover methods, and suggests that agreement
on a company statute for the EC has become a more realistic goal." id. at tit.p., ii. See
also Corporate Governance Code, FIN. TIMES, June 15, 1995, at 2.
100. Id. at iii.
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harmonized; European Guidelines for Best Practice; and areas for action
at the member state level.' °'
B. United Kingdom
The London Stock Exchange [hereinafter LSE] is the world's largest
center for trading non-U.S. equities.' °2 Share ownership has historically
been common to individual Britons. 3 Individuals directly hold 20% of the
market, and own another 58% through insurance companies, pension funds
and unit trusts) °n
The U.K. model of corporate governance is similar to that of the
U.S.' 5 While U.K. institutional investors traditionally influenced
management behind closed doors, they are now engaging in more visible
101. Id.
102. THE Dow JONES GUIDE To THE WORLD STOCK MARKET, 370 (Anthony Patrick, ed.,




105. Fund Urges Europe Corporate Reform, REUTERS, Sept. 6, 1995, available in
LEXIS. Nexis Library, Reuters News File.
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confrontations.'0 6  The U.K. context of corporate governance may
106. MONKS & MINOW, supra note 33, at 305). Some of the most recent and highly
visible examples of U.K. activism include:
Hanson Plc.
Joint protests from U.S. and U.K. institutional investors caused management of
Hanson plc. to withdraw a 1993 proposal to amend the company's bylaws to require a 10%
shareholder vote to nominate directors and 5% to amend ordinary resolutions. Id.
British Gas
Public interest in U.K. activism was made apparent when Joe Lamb, a semi-retired
Scottish professor, received 1,500 replies to a letter he sent to a newspaper expressing his
displeasure with executive compensation at British Gas. Richard Wolffe, Professor
Musters Army of Small Investors, FIN. TIMES, May 15, 1995, at 4. Ultimately
representing 800 small shareholders, his group backed two corporate resolutions. Id. The
resolutions sought establishment of an advisory group to interview the chair and chief
executive annually (and to include four private shareholders), and called for British Gas
to "revise their executive pay policy in line with best practice." William Lewis, Action
Call Goes to Big Shareholders, FIN. TIMES, May 15, 1995, at 4. The proposal was
sponsored by PIRC, a corporate governance consultancy which advises investment funds
and lobbied them to support the resolutions (see note 109, infra), gaining the support of
the opposition Labor party. Richard Wolffe, Professor Musters A rny of Small Investors,
FIN. TIMES, May 15, 1995, at 4. Labor's shadow industry minister, Nigel Griffiths, met
with individually with U.K. institutional investors to convince them that British Gas's
record and financial performance did not justify the proposed compensation plan. "How
these fund managers act at the annual meeting will greatly influence how we frame
legislation [on corporate governance] for the future... This is their chance to show that
they can be trusted to take action at companies when it matters." William Lewis, Action
Call Goes to Big Shareholders, FIN. TIMES, May 15, 1995, at 4. British Gas Chairman,
Richard Giordano, responded that the company employed best practice and that the
resolutions included incorrect or misleading sentences. Id. Since then, Giordano has moved
to encourage detailed corporate disclosure on executive pay. William Lewis, The Year of
the Tweaked Snouts, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 24, 1995, at 8. At the Company's annual meeting
in June, most shareholders voted against the compensation arrangement, but block voting
by pension funds reversed the decision. Id. The British Labor Party supports a
modification in British laws regulating such voting as a way to make pension funds more
accountable for voting and voting practice. Carita Vitzthum, Change Comes to European
Boardrooms, THE WALL ST.J., July 21, 1995. Legislation aimed at tightening pension fund
rules is being considered by Britain's parliament. Id.
British Gas ultimately announced that three of seven executive directors would leave
as "part of an orderly ongoing process of change," and claimed these changes were not
connected with poor performance or compensation controversy. Robert Corzine and
William Lewis, British Gas Overhauls its Boardroom, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 17, 1995, at 19.
Saatchi & Saatchi
Maurice Saatchi stepped down as chairman of the British advertising agency when
a consortium of U.S. and U.K. investors demanded that board members seek his removal.
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foreshadow governance developments in the U.S.
0 7
1. Development of Voluntary Corporate Governance Standards.
Over the past four years, three separate committees have been
assembled to study U.K. corporate governance issues, each of which has
had global implications. 0 8  These committees and their reports are
discussed in turn below. While other associations also contribute to the
Kevin Goldman, Saatchi Holders Stand Firm on Demand to Remove Chairman, THE WALL
ST. J., Dec. 16, 1994, at B3. The investors, controlling 32% percent of Saatchi's shares,
included Harris Associates, the State of Wisconsin Investment Board of the U.S., and
M&G, a U.K. investment group. Saatchi rejected a new position at the firm. Following
an industry conference speech six months after his ouster about what had made Saatchi &
Saatchi a unique advertising agency, Saatchi arranged a press conference. His only
comment to the assembled press was that in a "democracy of information," simplicity is
key. Maurice Spells out Saatchi Secret, Judy Webber, REUTERS, July 11, 1995, available
in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Reuters News File.
107. Bernard S. Black and John C. Coffee, See Hail Britannia? Institutional Investor
Behavior Under Limited Regulation, 92 MICH. L. REV. 1997, 2001 (1994). The article
profiles the U.K. market, financial institutions, self-regulatory organizations, regulations,
and institutional monitoring.
108. See, e.g., discussions of committee recommendations in the EC, supra, part IV.A.,
France, infra, part IV.C., and Australia, infra, at part IV.E.
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evolution of corporate governance standards,"°9 this note shall focus on the
committee reports.
i. The Cadbury Committee and Report on the Financial Aspects of
Corporate Governance
109. These include:
The Committee for the Promotion of Non-Executive Directors [hereinafter PRO
NED], established in 1982, chaired by Sir Adrian Cadbury, and backed by the Bank of
England, campaigns for the hiring of independent directors and acts as a candidate
clearinghouse. PRO NEDs efforts may have contributed to the increasing levels of
independent directors at U.K. firms. R.16.2. Bernard S. Black and John C. Coffee, See Hail
Britannia? Institutional Investor Behavior Under Limited Regulation, 92 MICH. L. REV.
1997, 2003 (1994).
Pension Investment Research Consultants [hereinafter PIRC] launched service in 1991
in response to U.S. investors holding shares in U.K. companies and seeking assistance in
exercising their voting rights in U.K. companies. R. 16.1. Malcolm Kitchen, Voting A dvice,
INVESTOR RELATIONS MAGAZINE, Summer 1994, at 34. The group bases its recommendations
on companies' Annual Reports to shareholders only, with no other company input. Id. The
group's membership comprises 57% of the U.K. equity market. MONKS & MINOW, supra
note 33, at 305.
The National Association of Pension Funds (NAPF), a proxy advisory firm, launched
a Voting Issues Service in 1992 to encourage pension funds to vote. Malcolm Kitchen,
Voting Advice, INVESTOR RELATIONS MAGAZINE, Summer 1994, at 34. Voting
recommendations are based on Cadbury Recommendations, as well as dialogue with
corporate management and corporate review of draft recommendations for comment and
correction. Malcolm Kitchen, supra 34, 35. The group's investment committee secretary,
John Rogers, suggests that areas to watch include: U.S. pension funds; rule changes in the
U.S. mean that [fund managers] are now likely to vote their shares in the U.K.; Executive
share options; Non-executives comprising remuneration committees; and length of
directors' contracts for service. William Lewis, The Year of the Tweaked Snouts, FIN.
TIMES, Dec. 24, 1994, at 8.
The Manifest Voting Agency, a corporate governance research and voting agency,
was created to service U.K. fund managers as they face heightened pressure to exercise
their voting power. According to the group, "[u]ntil recently, the costs of increased back-
office administration meant that routine voting just did not make sense. Unlike their U.S.
counterparts, British fund managers have not received the support they need in this area
of growing importance. Voting is now mandatory for all equities of ERISA funds,
regardless of where those assets are managed. British managers must therefore meet the
demands of this legislation in order to maintain their clear lead in the international
investment stakes." Voting Made Easy, INVESTOR RELATIONS MAGAZINE, Oct. 1995, at 21,
quoting Nigel Weller of Manifest. But see Perception Study of European Investor
Attitudes Toward U.S. Equities, Tavistock Communications Limited, (Oct., 1995), (on file
with author). "The vast majority of European fund managers claimed they do not actually
use their proxy rights."
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The LSE and the U.K. Financial Reporting Council formed a
committee given the task of codifying non-executive directors' roles and
responsibilities and developing self-regulatory guidelines." °  The
Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance (The
Cadbury Commission) issued its report.. and companion Code of Best
Practice 1 on December 1, 1992.13 Sir Adrian Cadbury, Committee
Chairman, credited the enormous attention received by the committee to a
harsh economic climate, concerns about financial reporting and
accountability, corporate failures, controversy over director's remuneration,
and a "climate of opinion which accepts that changes are needed."' 4
Cadbury noted, "Acceptance of the report's findings will mark an
important advance in the process of establishing corporate standards."
"Our recommendations will, however, have to be reviewed as
circumstances change and as the broader debate on corporate governance
develops."" 5
Wide-ranging report suggestions (not included in the companion code
for self-regulation) include the proposal that institutional investors meet
regularly with senior corporate managers and exercise voting rights "unless
they have a good reason for doing otherwise.""' 6 In addition, the report
suggests that institutional investors "use their influence as owners to ensure
that the companies in which they have invested comply with the Code
... the Committee is primarily looking to such market-based regulation to
turn its proposals into action."'' 7
While the report includes recommendations which go beyond current
U.S. practice,"' many of the Code's guidelines are not being applied in the
110. Michael Cassell, Blueprint For Good Boardroom Practice, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 28,
1991, at 17. The City Group for Smaller Companies (Cisco) drafted a voluntary code of
conduct to apply to smaller firms for whom compliance with Cadbury's weighty
recommendations would not be practicable. Cadbury Code Recommendations Toned Down
For Smaller Companies, THE INDEPENDENT, May 10, 1994, at 27.
111. REPORT OF THE COMMrlTEE ON THE FINANCIAL ASPECTS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE,






117. Id. § 6.16, at 52.
118. Memorandum from Adam 0. Emmerich, Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, To Our
Clients: New Code of Corporate Governance Proposed for U.K. Companies (Dec. 7, 1992)
(on file with author).
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U.K." 9 Nonetheless, the Cadbury Report has been credited with improving
corporate governance standards at U.K. firms. 20 Cadbury relies on
"statements of principle" as self-regulation.12 1
ii. The Greenbury Committee and Report on Executive Pay
The Greenbury Committee, set up in January 1995 to study the issue
of director's remuneration, issued a report and self-regulatory code of best
practice. 122 A survey of thirty U.K. institutional investors, conducted
shortly after publication of the Greenbury Report, indicates that half did
not believe the committee had addressed the issues it was established to
consider. 23 The Greenbury Report, like the Cadbury Report, although to
a lesser extent, spurred reviews of corporate governance in markets around
the world.
124
iii. The Hampel Committee
After delays and refusals by several British business leaders, Sir
Ronald Hampel was named chair of a committee on November 22, 1995.125
This successor committee is charged with determining the effectiveness of
119. Half of Top Firms Fail to Obey Code, THE TIMES, Jan. 23, 1995, at 44.
120. Id.
121. In a 1993 speech, Cadbury stated:
The essential points are that the pattern of governance is complex and is
enforced partly by regulation, partly by peer or public pressure and partly
through the conviction of those who head companies ... [T]here is a great deal
of common ground between our approach and that of the Americans, although
we have relied more on statements of principle, leaving it to boards to
implement them in ways which suit the particular circumstances of their
companies ... The drawback to external regulations being that they can too
readily become obstacles to be got round.
Sir Adrian Cadbury, Reflections on Corporate Governance, Ernest Sykes Memorial Lecture
to the Chartered Institute of Bankers. (Mar. 11, 1993) (on file with author).
122. DIRECTORS REMUNERATION, REPORT OF A STUDY GROUP CHAIRED BY SIR RICHARD
GREENBURY "THE GREENBURY REPORT"(July 17, 1995).
123. Greenbury Produces Apathy, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 29, 1995, at 11. The study also
indicates that over half express no view on compensation issues either to clients or to the
companies they have invested in. Id.
124. Whose Company is it, Anyway? ECONOMIST, Nov. 25, 1995, at 59. The Reports
"have inspired similar governance reviews around the world." Id. See discussions of
committee reports and recommendations for the EC, supra part IV.A. 1; France, infra part
IV.C. 1, ; Australia, infra part IV.E,.
125. Whose Company is it, Anyway? ECONOMIST, Nov. 25, 1995, at 59.
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the reforms recommended by the Cadbury and Greenbury Reports, and
suggesting improvements. 2 6 The Hampel committee is expected to focus
on three main areas: establishment of disclosure of executive pay; further
clarification of executive and non-executive director roles; and methods to
increase the interest of U.K. institutional investors in governance issues.
2 7
Committee performance is expected to be closely monitored in other
countries. 121
C. France
In the mid 1980's, the Paris Bourse undertook a program of
modernization and liberalization of foreign investment restrictions.2 9
Modernization caused upheaval in the French financial community, with
many participants finding themselves undercapitalized. 3 ° Limitations in
domestic market capacity require the participation of U.S institutional
investors in the privatizations of state-owned industries occurring in France
and throughout Europe. 3' The Paris Bourse has made efforts to attract
U.S. investors through presentations in Boston and New York. 3 2 The
recent French Companies Investor Show in the U.K. was supported by the
Bourse to promote French companies to U.K. fund managers.
33
126. Id.
127. Id. One possible avenue likely to be considered is a mandatory voting requirement.
128. Id.
129. THE Dow JONES GUIDE To THE WORLD STOCK MARKET, (Anthony Patrick, ed., Dow
Jones & Company in Association with Morningstar. Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliffs, N.J.
at 86 (1993)).
130. Id. at 87.
131. James A. Fanto, The Transfonnation of French Corporate Governance and United
States Institutional Investors, 21 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 1, 8 (1995). Professor Fanto's article
provides an excellent examination of trends in French corporate governance and the
influence of U.S. institutional investors from the perspective of current privitizations. He
concludes that although U.S. institutions currently play a part subsidiary to that of domestic
investors, their influence on the evolution of corporate governance in France may well take
on greater weight if domestic investment interest wanes. See also France Eyes
Transparency to Woo Investors, Christine Tierny, REUTERS, July 19, 1995, available in
LEXIS, Nexis Library, Reuters News File. "Although France is the world's fourth-largest
economy, the scarcity of domestic pension funds has left French corporations
disproportionally dependent on foreign capital." Id.
132. Paris Bourse Aims to Lure U.S. Investors in Roadshow, REUTERS, Mar. 1, 1995,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Reuters News File.
133. David Wighton, Investors Offered a Taste of France, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 26, 1995,
at 22.
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Many of France's banks and insurance companies are state owned or
heavily state influenced, and these are the major providers of finance to
French industry.'34 As in Germany and Japan, French banks are long-term,
management-friendly investors who protect French companies from the
threat of takeovers.'35 As in Germany, bearer shares, where companies keep
no record of shareholder names and addresses,' 36 predominate.'37 France's
system of cross-shareholdings (the verrouillage system) is similar to that
found in Japan and accounts for the majority of trading activity in
France. 3 ' Recent developments of particular interest affecting corporate
governance in France are discussed below.
1. Vienot Report
The chairmen of France's most influential companies issued a report
in July of 1995 recommending that French management adopt many
measures characteristic of U.S. and U.K. corporate governance. 39 A panel
advisor stated that "[t]he idea was to encourage practical improvements and
respond to concerns of shareholders, notably Anglo-American investors.
. [T]he Vienot report recognizes that cross-shareholdings with reciprocal
directors pose problems and can raise legitimate questions."' 140 The Report
was developed following board conflicts at a number of French
companies.'
4'
The Report does not adopt the Anglo-American emphasis on
maximization of shareholder value, reflecting instead the French corporate
purpose theory that employee's welfare and long-term strategic planning
134. MONKS AND MINOW, supra note 33, at 300-03. The experts' text analyze the current
state of Frances use of U.S. corporate governance, activism, globalization, and markets
discussed in this article.
135. Id.
136. "Bearer Form; Security not registered on the books of the issuing corporation and
thus payable to the one possessing it..." JOHN DOWNES & JORDAN ELLIOT, BARRON'S FINANCE
AND INVESTMENT HANDBOOK 183 (1986).
137. MONKS AND MINOW, supra note 33, at 300-03
138. Id.
139. France Eyes Transparency to Woo Investors, supra note 131. "The report
recommends the appointment of independent directors and the creation of special scrutiny
committees to ensure that the board can supervise the management." Id.
140. Id. (quoting Francois Henrot, chairman of Compagnie Bancaire.)
141. French Governance Proposals Get Cautious Welcome, Christine Tierney,
REUTERS, July 11, 1995, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Reuters News File.
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must be considered. 42 Committee Chair Marc Vienot, chairman of Societe
Generale, a leading French company, opposes mandatory regulation,
preferring that "we convince ourselves mutually" that report
recommendations be adopted. 43  Immediate French reaction has been
mixed, with some dismissing the Vienot Report and others claiming the
voluntary proposals are not extensive enough. 44 Thus, reaction to and
implementation of the Report's recommendations among French
corporations remains uncertain. 145 Political turmoil and crippling strikes
have diverted attention from the Report, which has thus far not made a
large impact. 46 Whatever the ultimate fate of the Vienot Report, it appears
likely that increasing globalization, attention by U.S. investors, domestic
factors, and a wave of scandals illustrating the vulnerability of key French




L'Association pour la Defense des A ctionnaires Minoritaires
[hereinafter ADAM] was founded in 1991 to advocate the rights of
minority shareholders.'48 It coordinates action and information with
domestic and non-French shareholder advocacy groups. 4 9
142. France Eyes Transparency to Woo Investors, supra note 131.
143. French Governance Proposals Get Cautious Welcome, supra note 141.
144. France Eyes Transparency to Woo Investors, supra note 131.
145. France Eyes Transparency to Woo Investors, supra note 131. Among the early
commentators, Sir Adrian Cadbury commented that "It's very much in line with the kind
of approach we have developed in Britain." But PSA Peugeot Citroen's chairman told an
assembled annual meeting audience "All this talk of corporate governance annoys me
tremendously... I'm exasperated by this trend in France to set up this committee and that
committee." Id. According to Bruce Babcock of ISS, 'The basic problem with corporate
governance in France is there is none." Claudia Strage & Katherine Burton, To The
Ramparts! Minority shareholders in France Seek Relief From the Corporate Ancient
Regime's Tyranny, BLOOMBERG MAG., Oct. 1995, at 31.
146. Sherman interview, supra note 24.
147. Thomas Kamm, Another Head Rolls In French Revolution: Suez Chief is Latest
Victim of Shareholder Activism, WALL ST.J., July 10, 1995, at A10. "Up until now, the
customs of our network capitalism hardly permitted asking . . . '[w]hat have you been
doing with my investment in your company?"' Id. citing Le Nouvel Economiste.
148. MONKS & MINNOW, supra note 33, at 302.
149. Id. at 302. Colette Neuville of ADAM believes "[T]he kinds of changes that must
take place in France as far as minority shareholders are concerned constitute a real
revolution, and that will take time." To The Ramparts! Minority shareholders in France
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Labor activism has affected management changes in corporate
France-striking Air France employees closed Paris airports and returned
to work only after the company's chairman resigned and the government
changed its position on layoffs.' 50 Non-U.S. labor organizations have not
yet used corporate governance to advance their causes, and it is much
harder to get a proposal on the ballot outside of the U.S.'
3. French Advisors
Sophie l'Helias, president of Franklin Global Investment Services
[hereinafter FGIS], a lobbying group for minority shareholders and U.S.
pension funds investing in France,15 2 believes "[u]ltimately, shareholders
themselves have to take the initiative, stay informed, and use their voting
rights."' 5 3  L'Helias prefers quiet diplomacy over litigation and
confrontational annual meetings.'54
D. Germany
German and U.S. corporations have traditionally had dramatically
different approaches to the capital markets and shareholder relations.'
Seek Relief From the Corporate Ancient Regime's Tyranny, supra note 145, at 31, 33.
150. Next Up in France, GLOBAL SHAREHOLDER, (INVESTOR RESPONSIBILITY RESEARCH
CENTER, WASHINGTON D.C.), Spring 1994, at 17. The government reportedly delayed
scheduled privatization of state-owned car-maker Renault to avoid a similar incident close
to elections. See discussions of DOL report on "High Performance Workplaces" and
increased activism by U.S. labor unions, PART II.B.1, supra.
151. Sherman interview, supra note 24.
152. Kamm, supra note 147.
153. Strage & Burton, supra note 145, at 31,32.
154. U.S. Funds to Protect French Interests, Discretely, REUTERS, Mar. 5, 1995,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Reuters News File. "The best thing is to avoid a loss
of face. Our aim is to discuss things. For the most part, problems arise from poor
communications." Discussed as particular issues for U.S. investors in France are
independence and remuneration of board members, fear of dilution, unequal treatment of
investors and 'French-style stock options.' Id.
155. David Duffy and Lachlan Murray, Germany Inc. Vs. The Big Board, THE ASIAN
WALL ST.J., Feb. 28, 1994, at 10.
In the U.S., management is ultimately responsible to the shareholder and an
efficient, liquid, transparent market is the ideal. In the words of the SEC's
chief accountant, "information is king and also queen." Under the German
system, creditors outrank shareholders in the corporate hierarchy. The country's
major financial institutions play a pivotal role in the capital markets and in
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Corporate governance, in the past, was not a pressing question facing
German issuers.'56 Since the early 1980's, Germany has recognized that
change is required to achieve a competitive domestic market and
participation by global investors. 5 7 The government seeks to strengthen
a system it believes to be basically sound, but cautions that "change is
more likely than dramatic change."'
58
German Stock Exchanges are regulated by The Stock Exchange Act
[hereinafter the Exchange Act]. 5 9 With no federal supervisory agency
comparable to the U.S. SEC, German Exchanges are self-regulatory and
subject to Lander (states) intervention. 60  Germany has, therefore,
traditionally relied on Boards Of Inquiry, which are private review boards
set up by individual stock exchanges.' 6' The German Parliament approved
The Financial Markets Act on July 8, 1994, which makes insider trading
a crime in Germany for the first time. 62 This legislation, motivated by
both pressure from international investors and Germany's economic goal
to have Frankfurt made the site of the European Central Bank, may
corporate governance by taking big stakes (on their own and on behalf of
individual clients) in leading companies. These stakes ... may lead to a less
liquid market, but Germans argue they are critical in enabling management to
peruse long-term strategies... Each side believes its position is philosophically
right ... the pressure has to be on Germany ...national boundaries barely
inhibit the movement of money and news. Id.
See generally JONATHAN CHARKHAM, KEEPING GOOD COMPANY, 6-69 (1994) for a thorough
overview of German corporate governance.
156. Dr. Ronald Frohne, Address at the Symposium on Corporate Governance and
Investor Relations, Tokyo, Japan (1993). Frohne quotes a german Banker circa 1930 as
illustrative of the German attitude toward shareholder issues, "Shareholders are silly, and
they behave outrageously. They are silly because they entrust money to the management,
and they behave outrageously because they request a dividend for their silliness." Id.
157. See Frederich K. Kubler, Institutional Owners and Corporate Managers: A German
Dilemma, 57 BROOK. L. REV. 97 (1991).
158. Andrew Fisher, Cracks Around the Edges-Germany's System of Corporate
Governance is Under Pressure to Reform, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 27, 1995, at 11. Parliamentary
state secretary at the justice ministry Ranier Funke has said "We must not succumb to the
idea that mistakes by individuals, even criminal activities of some, can be avoided by a
change in the legal system." Id.
159. Daniel James Standen, Insider Trading Reforms Sweep A cross Germany: Bracing
for the Cold Winds of Change, 36 HARV. INT'L. L. J. 177, 193 (1995).
160. Id. at 194.
161. Id. at 197.
162. Id. at 177.
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encourage greater levels of international investment and investment by
domestic individuals.
63
Like Japan, Germany developed a strong and stable market after
World War II with few contests for corporate control, limited shareholder
activism (allowing management free rein), and an interlocked base of
management-friendly shareholders. 64 Joint-stock companies must appoint
a supervisory board (A ufsichtsrat) and a management board (Vorstand).
165
The supervisory board represents shareholders and laborers, and oversees
the performance of the management board, which is, in turn, responsible
for management of the company. 166 Management may not be delegated to
the supervisory board, but the supervisory board may require that major
business transactions be subject to its prior approval.'67 Critics fear that the
potential for conflict resulting from the close involvement of the two
boards may preclude objective supervision.
168
163. Id. at 200-01.
164. STEPHEN M. DAVIS, SHAREHOLDER RIGHTS ABROAD: A HANDBOOK FOR THE GLOBAL
INVESTOR 61 (1989).
165. David Waller, A Shock to the System - German Shareholders are Starting to
Reject Their Boards' Traditional Lack of Accountability, FIN. TIMES, Aug. 6, 1993, at 9.
166. Regardless of their size, neither stockholders, nor the general stockholders meeting,
nor the supervisory board may give direction to the management board. In fact, attempts
at "influencing or directing the management board or its members generally is considered
an unlawful act." Dr. Ronald Frohne, Address at the Symposium on Corporate Governance
and Investor Relations, Tokyo, Japan. (1993).
167. Id.
168. Financial woes at Metallgesellschaft, a German conglomerate with 258
subsidiaries, fueled criticism that the German board system is not effecting adequate
monitoring. A Bashing From Metall, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 14, 1994, at 10; see also ISS First
Quarter Global Report, 1995, pp. 17-19. Shareholders initiated an accountant-led special
investigation into Metall's losses in 1994. The results, presented at the Company's 1995
AGM blamed the near bankruptcy on the former CEO and CFO of the firm, blaming them
for preventing the supervisory board from keeping informed of the losses which led to near
bankruptcy. The supervisory board was cleared of any responsibility. At this year's
meeting, shareholders were asked to approve the formal discharge of the 1992-93
supervisory board. Given it's policy of withholding discharge if legal action is pending
against a company or board members, and the likelihood that more information would arise
from pending litigation, ISS recommended voting against a discharge of the supervisory
board.
Metalls' new chairman has recently stated that he had been challenged with a
company "with a confused organization, no clear management responsibilities, far too many
peripheral activities, no continuous strategy, and heavy losses in some sectors." Andrew
Fisher, Off the Sick List And On A Recovery Path, Metallgesellschaft's Turnaround Has
Put it Back in Favor With Investors, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 15, 1995, at 24.
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This structure has been characterized as a "three-tier governance
structure," with the three statutory components strictly separated: the
general stockholders' meeting; the management board; and the supervisory
board. 169 These divisions preclude shareholders from influencing day-to-
day business, unless the management board decides to submit an issue to
shareholders. 70  Management board members are not appointed by
shareholders at the AGM, but by the supervisory board.' 71 More often, the
German system of governance is discussed in terms of a dual-board
structure, omitting the shareholders' role altogether.
72
The enormous power of banks and insurance companies in Germany
stems not only from their often-significant stakes in virtually every German
company, but from their representation on supervisory boards of about two-
thirds of German listed companies. 173  While supervisory-board
memberships are limited to ten per person, a ten-person management board
of a large German bank may control 100 supervisory board seats in
publicly-listed companies. 74 German banks administer the shareholdings
of most individual German investors, usually obtaining proxy-voting
authority. 75 Shares have traditionally been held predominantly in bearer
form 176 and meeting notices are mailed to custodian banks which in turn
inform stockholders. 177  Shareholder meetings in Germany have been
compared to Communist Party conventions, with dissenters precluded from
voicing concerns. 78 Excessive influence by the banks has emerged as a
169. Only decisions concerning corporate legal and financial structure require approval
by stockholders. Dr. Ronald Frohne, Address at the Symposium on Corporate Governance
and Investor Relations, Tokyo, Japan (1993).
170. Id.
171. The supervisory board, comprised of representatives of shareholders and
employees, normally appoints the management board by a simple majority. Id.
172. MONKS & MINNOW, supra note 33, at 299; citing a thorough market overview in
OXFORD ANALYIICA MrrED, BOARD DIRECTORS AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE TRENDS IN THE G7
COUNTRIES OVER THE NEXT TEN YEARS, (1992).
173. Dr. Ronald Frohne, Address at the Symposium on Comparative Corporate
Governance and Investor Relations, Tokyo, Japan (1993).
174. Id.
175. DAVIS, supra note 164, at 61.
176. "Bearer Form; Security not registered on the books of the issuing corporation and
thus payable to the one possessing it .. ." DOWNES & ELLIOT, supra note 136, at 183.
177. DAVIS, supra note 164, at 61.
178. "The consequences are often decisions more in the interest of the banks than the
company itself, much less shareholders as a group." Review & Outlook - Daimler and
Deutsche Bank, WALL ST. J., Aug. 14, 1995, at 10.
19971
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key structural problem as the German market competes for global
investment dollars, 7 9 and Federal legislation to reduce banks' shareholdings
has been introduced by the Social Democratic Party.8 ° Some banks are
already seeking to reduce their holdings and supervisory board
participation.'1
8
Minority shareholder activism in the form of shareholder suits is
virtually non-existent in Germany. 82 Individual investors, distrustful of the
stock markets, own only 7% of stock in German companies. 83 Despite
their own distrust of the market, Germans have not traditionally understood
foreign shareholders' objections to local accounting and disclosure
practices, believing that their practices strengthen corporate business
potential.'84 Disclosure obligations for official market participants allow
179. Id. "The stability that made Germany such an attractive, pro-enterprise place
during the Wirtschaftswunder years has transmogrified into paralysis... small companies
and innovative enterprises are losing out due to the big banking alliance." The article
quotes a study by Manfred Perlitz, professor at the University of Mannheim, which found
that German Corporations with the strongest bank influences carry more debt, "pay
relatively higher interest rates and have relatively low internal financing ratios." Id. The
study illustrates bank influences on corporate policy through their shareownership, proxy
voting and lending. The study concludes that bank-influenced decision making is neither
economically efficient not business friendly. But see Stanley J. Dubiel, Germany's
Universal Banks: Power Centers or Paper Tigers, ISSUE ALERT, Nov. 1994, at 9, citing
BA NKS, FINANCE AND INVESTMENT IN GERMANY, a study by economists Jeremy Edwards of
Cambridge University and Klaus Fischer of the London School of Economic Science, in
which the economists argue that German companies are much less dependant on banks than
is generally believed.
180. German Party Seeks to Curb Bank Powers, ISSUE ALERT, Mar. 1995, at 10.
181. Fisher, supra note 158, at 11. Deutsche Bank seeks fewer concentrated large
shareholdings, and is trying to lessen its role in supervisory boards. Bank director Ellen
Schneider-Lenne, stating that bankers should not accept chairmanships of non-executive
boards, believes "Industrialists tend to be better qualified because of their experience. The
job has changed in depth." Schneider-Lenne agrees with Sir Adrian Cadbury that the
Anglo-Saxon and German systems will eventually converge, and welcomes the
development of a Cadbury-type code for German Companies, saying "non-observance of
such a code would eventually be punished by the market." Id.
182. Standen, supra note 159, at 193.
183. Id. citing Glenn Whitney, Europe Moves to Curb Insider Trading, WALL ST.J., Nov.
4, 1993, at All.
184. Dr. Ronald Frohne, Norr, Stiefenhofer & Lutz, Munchen, Germany, A ddress on
Corporate Governance in Germany, at the Symposium on Corporate Governance and
Investor Relations, Tokyo, Japan (1993). Dr. Frohne cites treatment of bad debts as an
example. U.S. banks continued to show third world credits on their books, while German
banks had written them off. However, legislation was enacted in 1985 following an EC
directive on accounting practices and information required in balance sheets and business
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issuers to select the information and accounting methods to be included in
annual reports to shareholders.185  Special non-voting shares afford
management an opportunity to determine which shareholders get voting
rights.
8 6
The German parliament enacted the Financial Market Obligations Law
on January 1, 1995, to improve companies' financial disclosures and to
position the market as a key European financial center. 8 7 In addition,
revisions to Germany's Takeover Code have been developed by a
committee of stock exchange experts to protect shareholder rights in
mergers or acquisitions pending ratification of European Community (EC)
takeover provisions.' 0 These voluntary provisions' 9 took effect on
October 10, 1995.'9'
Regardless of whether they are seeking a New York Stock Exchange
[hereinafter NYSE] listing thereby requiring compliance with NYSE and
SEC guidelines, German companies have been improving disclosure and
dividend payout levels.' 9' This trend appears likely to continue., 92 While
German corporate governance has been less efficient than the U.S. model
in forcing management at underperforming companies to focus on business
problems, the strengths provided through this system may well influence
the U.S. model of governance.'93
reports. Daimler-Benz's compromise with the SEC on disclosures required to achieve a big
board listing did not reach the level of disclosure which would be required of a U.S. issuer.
Frohne leaves open the question whether Daimler-Benz will remain an isolated issue or the
start of a trend.
While some feel this development reflects the need of German industry to gain access
to the U.S. capital markets, others believe that German managers may object and prevent
any further development, on the grounds that too far-reaching disclosure may be helpful
to the shareholders but detrimental to the company itself. Id.
185. DAVIS, supra note 164, at 61.
186. Waller, supra note 165, at 9.
187. ISS First Quarter Global Report, 17 (1995).
188. Germany Create New Takeover Code, ISSUE ALERT (Institutional Shareholders
Services), Aug. 1995, at 10.
189. Id.
190. Sherman interview, supra note 24.
191. Anglo-German Capitalism, FIN. TIMES, Apr. 8, 1993, at 19.
192. Id.
193. Id. These strengths include strong relationships with key stakeholders: management
and workers; banks; suppliers; government and community. Id., see also supra note
24,(discussion of strengths of closed systems).
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2. German Activists
The German press and its readers are becoming more aware of, and
vocal about, the need for greater supervision of management in corporate
Germany. 94 Ongoing developments regarding recent corporate scandals
will likely provide fuel for the debate.' 95
The Schutzgemeinschaft der Kleinaktionaere e.V. [hereinafter SdK],
an association representing small shareholders, has called for an
amendment to German law which would increase auditors' liability and
require companies to replace auditors every seven years.' 96 The amendment
seeks to avoid potential conflicts of interest from the close relationships
many companies have with accountants. 97
The Association for the Protection of Minority Shareholders says that
in light of Germany's lenient disclosure laws, it is prudent for investors to
194. Karen Lowry Miller, Something's Rotten in... Germany ? Widespread Corruption
Has Come to Light at Opel, BUS. WK, Aug. 7, 1995, at 44.
But see Dr. Ronald Frohne, Address at the Symposium on Comparative Corporate
Governance and Investor Relations, Tokyo, Japan (1993):
Part of my topic today is to address the question of the future of corporate
governance in Germany as the role of U.S. investors increases. I am not sure
that the future will show an increase in the role of U.S. investors. John Wilcox
(Chairman, Georgeson & Company) mentioned that things are changing as a
result of activist groups in Germany, and it is true that certain activist groups
have started to make noises German stockholders meetings. Actually, I was
delighted to hear that in Japan stockholder meetings usually take no more than
20 minutes, and a two hour meeting is considered to be very long. Due to the
existence of these activist groups, stockholder meetings of a large German
company may last 12 hours or more. However, the practical impact of these
long discussions is virtually zero. The stockholders have the rights to ask
questions, but that is about it, and their resolutions do not pass.
Id.
195. See Henry Hamman, Deutsche Bank Tried to Ruin Me, Says Schneider, FIN.
TIMES, Sept. 16/17, 1995, at 3, in which Jurgen Schneider alleges that german banks
sought to criminilize him and ruined him by forcing his troubled development group
unnecessarily into bankruptcy. Schneider was interviewed from a U.S. detention center,
claiming that he fled Germany in fear of the power of his creditor Banks. A spokesman
for Deutsche Bank responded "Mr. Schneider's comments lie between the nonsensical and
the outrageous. It is high time this U.S. comedy is brought to an end and that he faces a
German court." See also Miller, supra note 194, discussing corruption at the german
car-maker and increasing calls for reform.
196. German Shareholders Want Audit Reforms, ISSUE ALERT, Sept. 1994, at 10. See
also Germany's Small Shareholders Want More Accountable Auditors, Knut M.




analyze a company's track record for reliability of disclosures before
investing. 98 The Association claims to have "a range of legal negotiations
in progress" to further protect minority shareholders.' 99
A sign of the changing times may have been presented when Professor
Ekkehard Wenger of the University of Wurzberg verbally attacked
management at Daimler-Benz's 1993 annual meeting.200 In keeping with
the conformist attitude still pervading German shareholder meetings,
Wenger was ejected.20 '
2. CalPERS in Germany
In 1992, CalPERS supported a motion against voting restrictions at the
annual meeting of RWE AG, Germany's eighth largest industrial group.
202
The motion had been made by DSW,2°3 a German shareholder protection
society.2° CalPERS' support for the motion took the form of exercising
voting power as well as the reading of a prepared speech voicing
condemnation of the restrictions.0 5
198. Vitzthum, supra note 106.
199. Id.
200. Waller, supra note 165, at 9.
201. Id.
202. David Waller and Martin Dickson, California A ctivism A rrives in Germany, FIN.
TIMES (London), Dec. 10, 1992, at 20.
203. DSW is an anachronism for Deutsche Schutzvereinigung fuer Wertpapierbesitz
(German organization for the protection of security holders). Facsimilie from Stanley
Dubiel, Analyst, ISS (on file with author).
204. Id.
205. Joe Lufkin of Global Proxy Services read in English a prepared statement:
Voting restrictions... are an embarrassing anachronism which pulls Germany
out of step with international norms. Shares with substandard voting rights get
a substandard price on the market. For RWE or any German company to
maintain voting restrictions while, at the same time, expecting to enjoy
continued access to international capital, is naive and unrealistic in today's
global capital market.
Id.
Lufkin was quoted as saying that he did not expect to affect the outcome of the
shareholder vote at the AGM, but hoped to influence debate in Germany. Waller &
Dickson, supra note 202, at 20.
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E. Australia
Corporate governance and shareholder rights in Australia are similar
to the U.K. model.2 °6 One distinction is that Australia's federal and state
systems have traditionally provided state authority over securities trading.20 7
Company and securities legislation in Australia have traditionally been
ruled by the individual States. 20 8 A co-operative scheme was signed in
1978 and was made operational in mid-1982 by the Commonwealth, the
six States, and the Northern Territory, to increase uniformity among the
States' legislation. 2 9 Both Australian companies and the securities industry
were regulated under the legislation that comprised the co-operative
scheme.21° Corporations were also subject to the Corporations Act and the
Australian Securities Commission Act, administered by the Australian
Securities Commission [hereinafter A SC]. 21' On January 1, 1991, a national
corporations law was adopted, and the ASC became the sole national
authority for administering corporations law and corporate regulations.21 2
The Business and Listing Rules of the Australian Stock Exchange
[hereinafter A SX] supplement legislation, 2 '3 and all ASX listed companies
are subject to additional Main Board Listing Rules.21 4 21% of Australians
own shares, but the trend is toward a concentration into managed funds.21 5
206. DAVIS, supra note 164, at 110.
207. Id. at 61.
208. NATIONAL AUTRALIA BANK INVESTMENT & TRUST SERVICES, The Australian and New




211. "Under national administration, enforcement resources are forecast to grow eight
fold." Id. at 7. The Corporations Act and Australian Securities Commission Act were
passed through the Australian Parliament and received Royal Assent. A High Court
challenge relating to incorporation issues by several States was upheld, but does not affect
the subsequent regulation of companies flowing incorporation. Id.
212. Id.
213. This legislation is administered by the National Companies and Securities
Commission, with day-to-day affairs delegated to the Corporate Affairs Commissions of
participating jurisdictions. Id. at 9.
214. "The Listing Rules are the strongest elements in the regulation of listed companies
in Australia and have received judicial and legislative enforcement." Id.
215. Australian institutional investors hold between 40 - 45%. Telephone interview
with Ian Matheson, Executive Director, Australian Investment Managers' Association
[AIMA], Jan. 16, 1996. [hereinafter Matheson Interview]
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The reputation of the Australian market was hurt in the 1980s by
failures at several listed companies whose managers ran the companies as
if they were private firms. 2 16  Corporate governance developments in
Australia provide an interesting example of the spread of the corporate
governance debate through actions by U.S. investors and advisory groups,
as well as the importance of assessing governance within the context of
home market practices.
Australian institutional investors, holders of a large stake of corporate
Australia, traditionally did not exercise this proxy voting rights.217
Negative votes from a small number of U.S. institutional shareholders had
come close to skewing voting results at an Australian annual general
meeting in 1993.218
Abdication of proxy voting rights by numerous Australian institutional
investors, influenced the Joint Statutory Committee on Corporations and
Securities to commission a study on the "Role of Institutional Investors. '219
As a result, a strong corporate governance movement has emerged in
Australia in the past few years, 22' and many Australian companies are
amending their articles of incorporation to clarify director affiliations, to
disclose related-party transactions and material interests, and to provide
directors and officers with greater insurance and indemnification. 22' The
ASX issued a discussion paper in September, 1994 eliciting responses to
proposed requirements that Australian-listed firms disclose to investors
their compliance with corporate governance measures.2 2 The Bosch223 and
216. National Australia Bank, supra note 208, at 18.
217. Burke, supra note 217, at 8.
218. Id. U.S. investors, a minority representing over 20 million shares, had voted their
shares, while Australian investors abstained.
219. The committee has not completed its enquiry, and has developed a discussion
paper reviewing submissions received, but has not yet tabled a report. Matheson Interview,
supra note 215.
220. BRUCE BABCOCK, Australia, ISS Special Report: Global Proxy Review- Fourth
Quarter, 1994 (Institutional Shareholder Services), 1994, at 3.
221. Id.
222. Australian Stock Exchange Limited, Disclosure of Corporate Governance Practices
by Listed Companies, Sept. 1994, at 1 (on file with author). The requirement will be
effective in July, 1996. The exchange has made it compulsory for companies to say what
they are doing, and lists fifteen areas to be covered. However, companies can comment
on as few of these areas as they like, making comparisons difficult. Matheson interview,
supra note 215.
223. CORPORATE PRACTICES AND CONDUCT, (2. ed., Business Council of Australia 1993)
(1991). Results of a working group chaired by Henry Bosch: 'The Bosch Report."
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Hilmer24 Reports offer recommendations for standards of corporate
governance best practice in the Australian context.
2 25
1. Australian Activists
The Australian Investment Manager' Association (hereinafter A IMA)
226
(formerly the Australian Investment Manager' Group (AIMG)) claims that
Australia's Corporate Governance Standards slipped behind the U.S. and
the U.K. initiatives in 1993.27 Fewer Australian companies reported
compliance with the Bosch Code on Corporate Governance, an Australian
counterpart to Britain's Cadbury Code. 22' The report concluded that
directors' of Australian firms are hindering foreign investment by failing
to meet the "global standards of corporate governance.,
229
The AIMA and the Australian Shareholders' Association [hereinafter
A SA ] have been attempting to increase awareness of corporate governance
and shareholders' rights issues and to keep them centered in public and
government debate.
224. STRICTLY BOARDROOM: IMPROVING CORPORATE GOVERNANCE To ENHANCE
COMPANY PERFORMANCE, (1993) (Frederick G. Hilmer, Chair 'The Hilmer Report").
225. See generally CORPORATE PRACTICES AND CONDUCT, supra note 223; and
STRICTLY BOARDROOM: IMPROVING CORPORATE GOVERNANCE To ENHANCE COMPANY
PERFORMANCE; supra note 224.
226. "The (ALMA) was formed in 1990 in the context of the same forces of change
being experienced overseas: the growing importance of institutional investors; a decline in
corporate performance; and a trend toward government intervention." Ian Matheson,
Speech at the RMIT Corporate Governance Conference: "Corporate Governance '95" (June
8, 1995) (transcript available from Australia Investment Managers' Association). The
group is the representative association for the major investment managers in Australia, and
defines its mission: "to represent the investment management industry in advancing the
integrity and efficiency of the Australian capital markets for the benefit of all investors."
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: A GUIDE FOR INVESTMENT MANAGERS & A STATEMENT OF
RECOMMENDED CORPORATE PRACTICE (June, 1995).
227. Australian Companies Fail to Meet U.K., U.S. Standards, AUSTL. FIN. REV., July
19, 1995, at 2. The article cites a study which claims that "boards of the large
organizations failed to delegate certain sensitive areas of responsibility so as to ensure the
board's effectiveness or to prevent possible conflicts of interest," and refers to the lack of
special committees on executive compensation at over 50% of Australia's largest
companies as falling below U.S. and U.K. standards on issues of compensation. The study
concludes this will "hinder Australian firms' capacity to raise funds from foreign and local
investors." Id.
228. Blaise Burke, Australia, Global Proxy Review: Second Quarter, 1994 (Institutional
Shareholder Services), 1994, at 3.
229. Australian Companies Fail to Meet U.K., U.S. Standards, supra note 227, at 2.
230. Burke, supra note 228, at 7. 'The integrity of the Australian market place in part
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depends on the level of disclosure and overseas investors perceptions of standards here,
quite apart from hard numbers. These took a battering during the late 80's, and we keep
reminding companies of that." Matheson interview, supra note 215.
The impact of such efforts may be seen in some recent examples of Australian
activism:
Goodman Fielder
Poor performance for over five years led four shareholders of Goodman Fielder Ltd.,
Australia's largest food group, to call a special meeting of shareholders to propose
restructuring of the board when their negotiations with the current board failed. The
dissidents' demands were met before the meeting could occur: the chairman and two
directors resigned, and three new directors with food sector experience were submitted for
shareholder approval. This was the first time Australian dissidents forced change in board
composition through public pressure.
Westpac
In 1993, dissident shareholders pressured the board of Westpac, one of Australia's
largest banking groups, to announce the resignation of five directors, including both the
chairman and deputy chairman. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, Vol. 1, No. 2, Apr. 1993, at
59.
NAB
National Australia Bank [hereinafter NAB] was the target of the first non-U.S.
shareholder action taken by New York City's pension fund in 1994. N.Y.C. Prods
Australian Bank on Fair Employment, GLOBAL SHAREHOLDER (Investor Responsibility
Research Center, Washington, D.C.) Spring 1994, at 6. A statement by Alan Hevesi, city
comptroller, was read at the bank's annual meeting in January, calling for fair employment
practices at the groups subsidiary in Northern Ireland. Id. Hevesi indicated that the bank
had refused to meet with members of Equality, a Northern Ireland Human Rights group
seeking equal opportunity. The New South Wales Labor Council a trade union umbrella
group in Australia, had threatened to close its accounts unless the issue was addressed.
According to Patrick Doherty of the comptroller's office, NAB responded to the statement
with an acknowledgement that current staffing at it's Northern Ireland subsidiary reflects
"past religious discrimination." Id. New York City plans to follow-up to determine NABs
plans for the subsidiary.
Coles Myer
A messy spill at Australia's largest retailer Coles Myer has left battle scars
among the nation's political and corporate elite, but one group has emerged
stronger than ever-big institutional investors. The market has fought hard to
oust executive chairman Solomon Lew and usher in a boardroom purge, coming
to blows with Prime Minister Paul Keating while enduring the wrath of several
Coles directors and the unrelenting heat of the media.
Big Funds Emerge Strong From Coles Battle, Jason Szep, REUTERS, Oct. 25, 1995,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Reuters News File. See also Nikki Tait, Coles Myer
Saga Enters its Final Throes, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 18, 1995, at 20. ISS advised U.S.
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2. Australian Advisory Groups
Institutional Shareholder Services [hereinafter ISS], a U.S. firm
providing proxy voting guidelines to investment managers and fund
administrators, has recently formed ISS/Australia,23" ' a joint venture with
domestic Australian advisors The Partners Group [hereinafter TPG] and
Corporate Governance International [hereinafter CGII.232 CGI worked with
the AIMA in drafting Corporate Governance Standards for the Australian
market.233
3. CalPERS in Australia
Richard Koppes of CalPERS told an Australian audience that:
We recognize . . . that decisions regarding local governance
customs are valid only with the complete knowledge of these
customs and of the legal and cultural bases of a country's
governance structures. Foreign investors who do not follow this
basic premise have paid a high price in loss of credibility and
effectiveness. We believe that success will come in knowing
when to "act American," when to act local, and when to take yet
institutions of its concerns with corporate governance standards at the Company, and in a
television interview aired in Australia discussed the fact that U.S. institutions would vote
their shares to display their displeasure. Coles Myer's Standards Are Queried By U.S.
Advisor Group, DOW JONES, Sept. 18, 1995, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Dow
Jones News File. Ultimately, Coles Myer and institutional investors reached a compromise
in which the Company was restructured and Lew was replaced as Chairman but retained
a board seat as vice chairman. Coles Myer Holders Approve Board Restructuring, DOW
JONES, Nov. 21, 1995, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Dow Jones News File.
Every time there is a Coles Myer type situation, interest in corporate
governance skyrockets. I think, to some extent, corporate governance was seen
by a lot of people, including the media, as a bit ambiguous. Coles Myer really
brought it home to the populous... Now people understand the link between
the role of the board, the governance of the company, and performance of the
company.
Matheson interview, supra note 215. Matheson says the AIMA heard from managers at
other Australian corporations during the Coles Myer affair, encouraging the group to be
sure Coles Myer was cleaned up for the sake of the marketplace. Id.
231. The ISS affiliate also uses the acronym ISS, but for Independent Shareholder
Services. Sherman interview, supra note 24.
232. Matheson interview, supra note 215.
233. Id. The attorney general has stated that the government will be watching the
business community's response to voluntary guidelines, and will step in if necessary.
Matheson interview, supra note 215.
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another approach. There is no single "right" national approach,
and a great deal of understanding must be brought to bear on
each situation in order to emerge not only with the goal attained,
but also with long-term credibility enhanced.234 (emphasis added)
F. Japan
Japanese company law is found in a centralized Commercial Code, and
the Ministry of Justice plays an important role in Commercial Code
matters. 35  The Securities and Exchange Surveillance Committee
[hereinafter SESC] began operations on July 20, 1993, as a division of the
Securities Bureau of Japan's chief financial regulator, the Ministry of
Finance [hereinafter MOF].236 Unlike the SEC, the SESC does not operate
as an independent agency.237 Committee executives and staff are appointed
by the MOF, although the MOF has stated respect for SESC
independence.23s
Traditional lack of a takeover market and a concentration of
shareownership are characteristic of Japan, despite the liquidity of the
Japanese market.239 The system developed as a result of market needs for
external financing while the capital market was underdeveloped. 24' Due to
a postwar capital shortage in the wake of World War II, Japanese banks
played a key role in economic rehabilitation, both by holding shares in
Japanese corporations and providing the bank financing that allowed
affiliated companies to buy shares in each other's companies. 24' This
234. Richard H. Koppes, Presentation at Access to U.S. Capital Markets: What
Companies Should Know A bout U.S. Markets & Institutional Investors Conference, (June
15/16, 1995)(on file with author) (emphasis added).
235. Professor Akira Morita, Address at the Symposium on Corporate Governance and
Investor Relations, Tokyo, Japan, (May 10, 1993) (on file with author).
236. Bruce Babcock, The 1992 Global Proxy Season: Japan (Institutional Shareholder
Services), 1992, at 38.
237. Id.
238. Id. at 38.
239. Masahiko Aoki and Hyung-KI Kim, Corporate Governance in Transition
Economics, Finance & Development, Sept. 1995, at 20. (Article based on CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE IN TRANSITIONAL ECONOMIES: INSIDER CONTROL AND THE ROLE OF BANKS,
MA AND HK, (EDS.), WORLD BANK, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT INSTITUTE, Washington,
1995.)
240. Id. Masahiko Aoki and Hyung-Ki Kim suggest that while this history differs from
that faced by transition economies today, the Japanese experience is useful in assessing the
development of capital market and corporate governance in transition economies. Id.
241. Keikichi Honda, President, BOT Research International, Ltd.; Address on Issues
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system allowed Japanese companies to maintain control and avoid
takeovers as domestic managers maximized self-sufficiency and developed
financial strength. 42
While the large pre-war groups (zaibatsu), were controlled by
dominant holding companies, the current dominant holders (keiretsu) are
loosely affiliated through crossholdings.243  Unless a company is
experiencing serious financial woes, Japanese banks exercise little
boardroom power.'" Given the concentration of shareownership in the
friendly hands of reciprocal investors, Japanese corporations have been
insulated from short-term pressures and have thus been able to survive
difficult economic times.245 Japanese monitoring is informally conducted
through the keiretsu and banks. 246 Individual share-holdings in Japan are
low, with 20.4% of Japanese stocks held by individual investors.247 The
Japanese board is a management board comprised almost entirely of full-
time employees.4a Corporations are required to have at least three
directors who are elected by shareholders to serve a fixed term not to
exceed two years;24' boards with up to thirty members are not unusual.
25 0
While important decisions must be approved by the board, a consensus is
usually developed informally outside the board setting. 25'
Facing Japanese Corporations in the U.S. Capital Market and Their Relations with
International Investors, Symposium on Comparative Corporate Governance. See generally
Curtis J. Milhaupt, Managing the Market: The Ministry of Finance and Securities
Regulation in Japan, 30 STAN. J. INT'L L. 423 (1994) for an excellent history of the
Japanese regulatory regime, and as providing a more flexible framework than originally
understood.
242. Davis, supra note 164, at 61.
243. Analyzing Japanese Financial Statements: Practical adjustment procedures for
intercorporate share ownership, MICHAEL E. BRADBURY AND MASAYASU UNO,
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, Vol. 1, No. 2, Apr. 1993, 76-82.
244. William Dawkins, Loosening of the Corporate Web, FIN. TIMES, Nov. 30, 1994,
London Ed., at 15.
245. Mark D. West, The Pricing of Shareholder Derivative Actions in Japan and the
United States, 88 Nw. U.L.REV. 1436 (1994).
246. Id.
247. Id. at 76.
248. INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL MARKETS GROUP (ICMG), INTERNATIONAL CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE: WHO HOLDS THE REINS? 16 (June 1995).
249. West, supra note 245, at 1436.
250. Id. The Japanese concept of corporate officers is broader than the U.S. counterpart,
and Japanese boards would includes any one considered senior management in the States.
Id.
251. Dawkins, supra note 244, at 16.
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The system of cross-shareholdings is, however, beginning to loosen.252
Even if the keiretsu were to fall away completely, basic differences in
Japanese and Anglo-Saxon concepts of corporate purposes would remain.253
Differences in disclosure requirements are a source of concern for U.S.
investors in Japan.254  Ongoing financial disclosures by Japanese
corporations are slight compared with the level of disclosure required of
U.S. corporations. 211 Japanese markets emphasize revenue growth and
market share, focusing less on yearly earnings than U.S. counterparts.256
Japanese investors have traditionally been content with capital gains rather
than greater dividend payouts.257
Financial and corporate scandals have acted as catalysts in recent
regulatory reforms. 258 In 1993, the Japanese Securities Dealers Association
began lectures discussing corporate disclosure.259 Japan's "Big Four"
securities houses (Nomura, Nikko, Daiwa and Yamaichi) 260 have been
encouraging Japanese companies to learn the basics of investor relations
to better position themselves to attract investors.26'
Annual meetings are another source of concern for U.S. investors in
Japan. Until 1982, Japanese companies routinely paid petty gangsters
252. Id. at 15.
253. Unwritten loyalties between management, shareholders, employees and special
business interests are at the heart of the Japanese corporate purpose. Id.
254. Quentin Hardy, Japanese Shareholders Gain More Rights, THE ASIAN WALL ST.J.,
July 14, 1993, at 1.
255. DAVIS supra note 164, at 64. (quoting the SEC that "The Japanese disclosure
system requires substantially less disclosure than that required by the [U.S.] Securities Act
of 1933.")
256. Andrew Clark, User's Guide, Morningstar American Depositary Receipts, Foreign
Corporate Reporting Practices, (Vol. 4 Issue 9) (1995) at 5.
257. Japanese Insurers - Low Dividend Payouts Hurt Portfolios, DOW JONES Apr. 6,
1995, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Dow Jones News File. See also BRUCE
BABCOCK, ISS: THE 1992 GLOBAL PROXY SEASON (JAPAN) at 40.
258. Ko-Yung Tung, Partner O'Melveny & Myers, Address on Globalization of Capital
and Corporate Governance, at the Symposium on Corporate Governance and Investor
Relations, Tokyo (1993)(on file with author); see also Curtis J. Milhaupt, Managing the
Market; The Ministry of Finance and Securities Regulation in Japan, 30 STAN. J. INT'L L.
423 (1994).
259. See Hardy, supra note 254, at I, for a discussion of legal changes making
shareholder derivative suits more practicable.
260. Gerard Baker, Surging Bonds Boost Japan's Big Four Stockbrokers, FIN. TIMES,
Oct. 24, 1995, at 19.
261. These firms train executives at client companies on the importance of investor
relations.
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(sokaiya) to stave off threatened disruption of annual meetings.262 Once
pacified, the sokaiya would maintain order for management at meetings.263
The existence of this tradition has caused management to schedule
Japanese meetings simultaneously in late June, with little prior notice to
investors before the meeting, to minimize sokaiya interference. 2 4
Japan's persistent problem with sokaiya has taken a new twist since
Japanese companies began paying record-breaking dividends. 265 A rash of
crimes against Japanese executives has been headlined as "The Dark Side
of Companies vs. Shareholders., 266  Treatment by the Japanese press of
activist U.S. institutional investors casts the debate in the terms familiar to
the Japanese market, sometimes identifying U.S. activists with hecklers and
greenmailers.267  U.S. institutions fear that efforts to silence local
gangsterism will also quiet the voice of investor activism.
268
1. Japanese Activists
Japanese shareholders are voicing displeasure. Shareholders of Daiwa
Bank Ltd. filed a complaint in Osaka District Court seeking payment of
$1.1 billion in damages from thirty-eight Daiwa executives. 269 The suit
follows in the wake of U.S. and Japanese regulators sanctions of the Bank
for failing to notify regulators of vast trading losses incurred by a New
York-based trader.27°
262. DAVIS, supra note 164, at 61.
263. Id.
264. DAVIS supra note 164, at 61; see also In Japan, the SokaiyaAnd the Sword; Will
Attacks on Executives Chill Efforts to Open Up Meetings?, IRRC Global Shareholder,
Spring 1994, at 18-19.
265. John M. Taylor, In Japan, the Sokaiya And the Sword; Will Attacks on Executives




269. Greenspan Says Daiwa Exec's Plan To Fight Lawsuit, DOW JONES, Nov. 28,
1995, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Reuters News File.
270. Daiwa Bank Suffers Fresh Blow As Shareholders Sue, Velisarios Kattaoulas,
REUTERS, Nov. 27, 1995 available in NEXIS, Reuters News File; see also Gerard Baker,
Hidden Behind a Screen of Stability: The Cover Up of Daiwa's Losses Reflects a Wider
Problem in Japan's Business Culture, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 24, 1995, at 2.
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2. CalPERS in Japan
CalPERS has stated a concern that Japanese corporate leadership is
perceived as only marginally concerned with shareholders other than the
large shareholding banks and corporate groups who dominate Japanese
27corporate governance.  CaIPERS's offered a "wish list" of governance
initiatives for Japan to an audience of executives in Tokyo in 1993, while
stating an appreciation for cultural and legal differences and an
understanding that "there is no 'right' national approach. 272 CalPERS later
271. Dr. William D. Crist, Address on CaIPERS Experience in Corporate Governance
and Suggestion for Improvement in Japanese Corporate Governance and InvestorRelations,
at the Symposium on Comparative Corporate Governance and Investor Relations, Tokyo,
Japan, (May 10, 1993) (on file with author). The symposium was sponsored by the Council
for Better Corporate Citizenship [hereinafter CBCC], a tax exempt organization established
in 1989 as an affiliate of Keidanren, the Japanese Federation of Economic Organizations.
CBCC attempts to heighten awareness of Japanese firms investing abroad to the
concern of local communities and nations, and to facilitate Japanese firms'
integration into and smooth adaption to foreign business environments. From
its establishment, CBCC has taken an interest in strategies to meet the need of
the various "stakeholders" in a corporation's activities, and this interest has led
CBCC to focus a number of programs upon corporate governance-related
issues.
Id.
272. Id. The wish list included the following:
1. Boards of Directors. CaIPERS would like to see major Japanese corporations
begin (to) open up their boards to non-executive director, and reduce board size
to 10-15 persons.
2. Dividends. If a company's growth avenues are limited, excess reserves
should be limited to shareholders. (See discussion of dividend payout levels,
part IV.F, infra)
3. Financial Disclosure and Reporting. CalPERS would like to see the
following improvements in Japanese disclosure requirements: more rigorous
requirements for consolidated disclosure, and a requirement to consolidate all
50% plus owned subsidiaries; more rigorous requirements for marking assets
to market; greater disclosure by division and geographic region; better access
to information for auditors and a stronger auditor report.
4. Investor Relations Department. Japanese companies have relegated investor
relations functions to accounting/finance departments which do not have
resources to do much more than answer questions, or to public relations
departments which lack access to information, and which see their role as
promotional. The best solution may be to create an investor relations
department which reports directly to the CEO, which has access to information
and specific responsibility. (See discussion of Investor Relations, part V,B.I
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wrote to eighteen Japanese companies seeking information on board
composition and dividend policies.273 CalPERS then voted proxies at the
shareholder meetings of these corporations.
274
At that time, CalPERS had over $3 billion invested in Japanese
securities. 275 Today, CalPERS hold $14.3 billion in international equities,
with $4 billion invested in Japanese securities.276
In the past, foreign institutions have been frustrated in their attempts
to voice concerns to Japanese companies by voting their proxies at annual
meetings.- 7 Negative votes from numerous foreign institutions were voted
but not tallied, having been lost by the custodial banks responsible for
effecting the votes. 278 Today, there seems to be a reliable way to have
votes cast, provided rules are followed carefully.
2 79
V. CONTINUATION OF CURRENT TRENDS
AND LONG-TERM, INCREMENTAL RESULTS
A. Continued, Progressive and Ongoing Globalization
of Capital Markets and Corporate Governance Issues
The globalization of markets, which has gained momentum since the
end of World War II and will likely increase, has resulted in irreversible
"economic linkages" among countries, incrementally shifting the focus
infra.)
5. Proxy Voting. Annual Shareholder meetings should be spread out through
longer time period . . . It may be necessary to relax the Commercial Code
requirements . . . Shareholders should receive proxy materials in further in
advance of the meeting than the current 14 day requirement. And it should be
made easier for foreign shareholders to vote individually shares that are held in
omnibus custodian accounts. Id.
Japanese companies are rethinking dividend policies, financial disclosure and the audit
function. Gillan interview.
273. CalPERS Votes Proxies at Meetings of Shareholders of Japanese Firms, BNA
International Business & Finance Daily, July 19, 1994.
274. Id.
275. Id.
276. At January 18, 1996. Gillan interview, supra note 92. In addition, CalPERS holds
$2.2 billion in U.K. securities, $800 million in French equities, $800 million in German
equities, and $400 million in Australian equities. Id.
277. Dickson, Governance Goes Global, supra note 29, at 14.
278. Id.
279. Sherman interview, supra note 24. But see supra, note 60.
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from nation-states toward industry and individual enterprises. 280 Investor
confidence is necessary to the functioning of both domestic and
international markets. 21 Deregulation and ongoing reform of international
financial markets as they compete for global capital will increasingly make
these markets more accessible. Non-local investors who access these
markets will seek governance standards sufficient to merit their
investments.282
The U.S. SEC and Britain's Securities and Investment Board
[hereinafter SIB] have launched a joint probe of management controls at
firms conducting major cross-border securities dealings.283 The regulators
plan to work with local counterparts to select and monitor global firms
with significant operations outside of the U.S. and the U.K. 284  Co-
operative efforts between existing regulatory bodies are also employed by
the International Organization of Securities Commissions [hereinafter
IOSCO], an association of regulators from forty-eight countries. 285]
1. Increasing Levels of U.S. Institutional Ownership Abroad.
U.S. institutional investors seek investments abroad for higher returns
and to reduce portfolio risk through greater risk diversification.286 Holdings
of foreign equities have grown at a compound rate of 18% from 1990 to
the first half of 1995.287 A projection of current rates indicates holdings
will double every four years.288 Individual investors also appear to be
gaining interest by investing abroad, opening yet another segment of the
U.S. market to non-U.S. investment 289
280. S. Tamer Cavusgil, Globalization of Markets and Its impact on Domestic
Institutions, 1 IND. J.GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 83 (1993).
281. Margaret Maureen Samuel, International Financial Markets and Regulation of
Trading of International Equities, 19 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 327, 328 (1988/1989).
282. See, e.g., infra part V.A. 1.
283. U.S. SEC, U.K.'s SIB To Scrutenize Int'l Activities, REUTERS, July 17, 1995,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Reuters News File.
284. Id.
285. THE GLOBALIZATION OF REGULATION - THE WORK OF THE INTERNATIONAL
ORGANISATION OF SECURITIES COMMISSIONS (IOSCO), CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, 46
(1993) Vol. 1, No. 1.
286. See generally Bruno H. Solnik, Why Not Diversify Internationally Rather Than
Domestically, FIN. ANALYSTS J., Jan./Feb. 1995, Vol. 51, No. 1, pp. 89-94, reprinted from
FIN. ANALYSTS J. (July/Aug. 1974), at 48-54.
287. See 1H95 Capital Flows, supra note 14, at 8.
288. See 1H95 Capital Flows, supra note 14, at 8.
289. See GLOBAL INVESTORS: REGISTERED REPRESENTATIVE MAGAZINE, Nov. 1994,
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2. Increasing Use of Quantitative/Passive Investment Techniques By Non-
U.S. Investors.
As the universe of equities and issuers becomes larger through
increasing accessibility to international investments, non-U.S. investment
managers will increasingly employ passive290 investment techniques. These
will include decisions to take the path chosen by CaIPERS when it decided
to index assets,29' or to employ quantitative models that will assist in
screening the universe for investments worthy of greater active equity
analyses, and potentially, investment.292 Japanese and British investors are
already applying and refining models. 93
3. Technology
Advances in technology increasingly allow corporations to provide
increased disclosure to investors about specific equities,294 and markets to
create new trading methods. 295 As a result, local stock exchanges and
regulations will require ongoing modification to remain competitive.
at 22. The magazine, geared to retail investment representatives, quotes a survey of mutual
fund owners conducted by the Gallup Organization for Scudder, Stevens & Clark, which
finds that half of the current holders of international and global mutual funds plan on
investing more heavily, and eighteen per cent of non-holders plan on investing in non-U.S.
equities. The study polled a random sampling of 1,000 U.S. households who owned
mutual funds outside employer-sponsored retirement plans. Id.
290. See supra, note 43 for a discussion of various passive investing techniques.
291. It seems ironic to call this a "passive" investment technique in the context of
CalPERS as activist shareholder.
292. S&P, The Financial Times (FT), and Morgan Stanley & Company's the Morgan
Stanley Capital International (MSCI) indices provide representative portfolios of
investments constructed to track performance of various world markets. Debbie Galant,
Index Appeal, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR, Aug. 1995, at 109. The indices are used by
investors to assist in asset allocation and stock selection decisions, measurement of
performance, and the development of indexation and passive investment techniques.
Morgan Stanley Capital International marketing brochure, at 3 (on file with author).
293. Barry Riley, The Trouble for Harry in Modelling the All-Share, FIN. TIMES, Oct.
4, 1995, at 17.
294. Joseph McCafferty, How Much To Reveal Online, CFO Dec. 1995, at 12,
discussing a study indicating that: 38% of U.S. companies have Internet sites; 39% plan
sites within the next two years; 42% of the sites planned are being developed for investor
relations purposes. Id.
295. Silvia Ascarelli, Scanning the Web For a World of Stock Market Tips, THE WALL
ST. J., Dec. 22, 1995, at C1.
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A recent example may be seen as the LSE struggles to maintain its
dominance in global equity trading.296 The LSE will launch an order-
driven system in August of 1996,297 following the implementation of
Tradepoint, an electronic order-driven equity trading system2 98 developed
by former stock exchange officials.2 99 Like Nasdaq in the U.S., the LSE
publishes prices by market makers who buy or sell shares within price and
volume limits.3" Similar to the majority of continental European
exchanges, Tradepoint participants place buy or sell orders through a
computer link.30  The disadvantage to such a system is that transactions
can only be effected when a buyer and seller agree on price, unlike a quote
driven system where market makers trade for their own account as well as
for clients, often doing so to provide liquidity.
30 2
Critics fear systems like TradePoint will not support illiquid issues or
market downturns... even though trading volume on TradePoint is a
fraction of LSE trading volume.3° The LSE's "best execution" rule,30 5
which forbade market makers from offering better prices for U.K. equities
on competitive exchanges, was dropped following the launch of
TradePoint.306 The rule had limited electronic trading through TradePoint
and Instinet, an electronic broker and exchange member which had been
seeking a relaxation of the rule. 307 The LSE has stated its intention to
monitor the impact of the rule change and to revisit the issue.308 Further
worries for established exchanges may come from trading among private
296. London Stock Exchange Faces Threat From European Rivals, Jane Suiter, DOW
JONES, Oct. 26, 1995, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Dow Jones News File.
297. Id. The new system, Sequence, is expected to combine market-making and order-
driven trading systems. id.
298. Nicholas Bray, London Stock Exchange Under Siege by Rivals, THE WALL ST.J.,
Sept. 29, 1995.
299. London Stock Exchange Wrestles With Electronic Trade, Samuel Perry,
REUTERS, Oct. 24, 1995, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Reuters News File.
300. Bray, supra note 298.
301. Bray, supra note 298.
302. Bray, supra note 298.
303. Bray, supra note 298.
304. Bray, supra note 298.
305. Norma Cohen, Stock Exchange Drops Rule Which Scuppers Rivals, FIN. TIMES,
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investors via the Internet. 3°9 This method of trading shares has been
suggested as eventually creating a worldwide "virtual" exchange. 1 °
In October, 1995, the SEC set up a WorldWide Web site to make
corporate filings and reports available to investors.31  Thus far, the SEC
has refused proposals to make centralized communications to investors
through the site.31 2
4. Changes In Investment Horizons: U.S. Short-Termism vs. Longer-Term
View Of Non-U.S. Investors
The conflicting need for management to increase the value of the firm
for the long-term, while maximizing short-term returns for shareholders and
the raising of capital is one of the central issues of global corporate
governance.1 3 Corporate America is being encouraged to adopt a longer-
term perspective to build and maintain competitive standing.3" 4
For management to be able to do this, it must seek shareholders with
a long-term perspective on investment. 35 "Relational investing" has been
proposed as a solution.31 6 A concise definition of relational investing is yet
to be developed, and variations in technique range from more cooperative
investor dialogue with management to the commitment of voluntary long-
309. Internet Share Trade "Unstoppable," REUTERS, Sept. 8, 1995, available in
LEXIS, Nexis Library, Reuters News File.
310. Id. Given share custody and settlement as well as taxation and trade execution
issues, the virtual exchange will take time to develop and raises interesting regulatory and
oversight issues.
311. SEC Lets Investors, Finns to Link Via Cyberspace, REUTERS, Oct. 5, 1995,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Reuters News File.
312. Id. SEC Commissioner Steve Wallman is quoted saying "I don't think the world
is quite there, yet." Id.
313. See generally Aleta G. Estreicher, Beyond Agency Costs: Managing the
Corporation for the Long Tenn, 45 RUTGERS L. REV. 513 (1993); Thomas Lee Hazen,
The Short-Term/Long-Term Dichotomy and Investment Theory: Implications forSecurities
Market Regulation and for Corporate Law, 70 N.C L. REV. 137 (1991).
314. Invest More In Research, Training To Improve Competitiveness, Study Says.
BNA International Business Daily, June 30, 1994, (citing the findings of 'CAPITAL
CHOICES: CHANGING THE WAY AMERICA INVESTS IN INDUSTRY', a study coordinated by
Michael Porter and sponsored by CII.)
315. John C. Wilcox, Chairman, Georgeson & Company, Inc, Relational Investing: Can
It Really Work? N.Y.L.J., May 6, 1993, reprinted from THE GEORGESON REPORT.
316. Id. See generally Salvatore Franco, Should Institutional Investors Play A Role In




term shareholding and active participation in corporate decision making." 7
Heightened attention to issues of corporate performance, executive
compensation, and communication with shareholders are increasingly
forcing corporate management to build relationships with investors.:'
Change by the investment community is more problematic, requiring a
rethinking of investment technique and philosophy as well as a redefining
of the fiduciary duties owed by investment managers to beneficiaries.. 9
5. Shareholders/Stakeholders Controversy
Stakeholder considerations have traditionally factored into the theories
of corporate purpose in Germany and Japan, with participation by and
consideration of employees and banks. 320 These markets will increasingly
be forced to compete for capital with corporations offering higher returns
to domestic and international shareholders.3 2' At the same time,
corporations in the U.S. and the U.K. acknowledge the supremacy of
shareholders' interests, but are increasingly aware of the needs of
employees and local communities.322
B. Heightened Global Scrutiny of Directors/Management
Shareholder activists could not and do not seek to run the companies
in which they have invested.313 Their best protection of investments is
through processes ensuring that directors elected to oversee the company
do So. 3 24 Model codes such as those of the U.K., Australia, and the EC
will be monitored and refined.325 Code suggestions adopted by consensus
317. Wilcox, supra note 315.
318. Id.
319. Id.
320. ICMG, supra note 248, at 16.
321. Id.
322. Id. See also discussion of DOL report on "High Performance Workplaces" and
increased U.S. labor union activism, part II.B. supra.
323. James A. White, U.S. Pension Funds Weigh Cuts in the Number of Stocks They
Own, ASIAN WALL ST. J., Oct. 24, 1991, at 9.
324. Id.
325. U.S. institutional investors have put a lot of money into emerging
markets in the past couple of years. That is where you want to be
able to vote, because there are huge restructurings and
reorganizations and a lot of financial shenanigans at the outset. It's
very hard to get proxy materials and register your vote. Our clients
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and common interest at leading companies in various markets will
encourage investors' comparison with non-complying companies, and will
be rewarded by the market.
1. Increased Voluntary Efforts By Corporations-Greater Adoption of
Investor Relations and Corporate Governance Recommendations.
Sir Adrian Cadbury believes, "What was achieved informally and over
time in the past now has to be part of a more formal induction process,
taking advantage of advances in methods of communication." '326 Investor
relations, the discipline of developing and maintaining ongoing cooperative
dialogue with shareholders and the investing public,327 will assume greater
significance for corporate boards and managers as a result of these
developments. Worldwide trends increasingly force institutional investors
and global companies to act upon responsibilities which had, in the past,
been more theoretical than practical.328 Anachronistic local norms, which
are very interested in being able to vote in these markets. The
corporate governance model that is used presents an interesting
dilemma. One set of experts recommends the Anglo-American style
system: one share, one vote; open shareholder rights; a democratic
sort of system. Another group thinks that in the early stages these
markets should follow a French (or German or Japanese)
model-deliberately create a controlling group of shareholders that
will protect local interests, and let them develop not subject to
takeover attacks, minority shareholder rights. While that does have
virtue in the development in a market, the problem is (as in France,
Germany and Japan), they become self perpetuating systems.
Sherman interview, supra note 24.
326. Sir Adrian Cadbury, Reflections on Corporate Governance, Ernest Sykes Memorial
Lecture to the Chartered Institute of Bankers. (Mar. 11, 1993) (on file with author).
327. Investor Relations, a corporate marketing activity, combining the
disciplines of communication and finance, provides present and
potential investors with an accurate portrayal of a company's
performance and prospects. Conducted effectively, investor relations
can have a positive effect on a company's total value relative to that
of the overall market and a company's cost of capital.
IR JOB DESCRIPTIONS, NATIONAL INVESTOR RELATIONS INSTITUTE (NIRI), Spring 1991,
at 3.
328. See generally John H. Matheson, Brent A. Olson, Corporate Cooperation,
Relationship Management, and the Trialogical Imperative for Corporate Law, 78 MINN. L.
REV. 1443 (1994), for a discussion of the importance of effective communication (termed
a "trialogue" rather than dialogue to indicate participation by the board, long-term
shareholders and stakeholders). The authors argue that the board will be the mediator of
"trialogue.") Id. at 1446.
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once served important historical purposes in rebuilding or developing
markets, may be expected to fall away as they make local markets seem
uncompetitive, unaccessible or unacceptable in the global marketplace.329
As activist investors continue to refine their goals and local market
applications, 3 ° communication to investors of long-term strategies and
implementation of strategy will become a larger part of the duties of
directors and corporate managers.' Aided by technological advances in
communication and data,332 the benefits of maintaining ongoing
communication with investors will progressively be understood to outweigh
the time and costs involved. In light of these factors, it is reasonable to
expect that investor relations will increasingly be viewed as a necessary
corporate function for competing in the global market for capital. 33
In January of 1994, the New Foundations Working Group, a Harvard
University-based working group, issued recommendations suggesting that
improved shareholder communications could achieve corporate governance
benefits "without changes in laws or regulations or in the rights accorded
investors or reserved to management. '' 334
The EC has recommended self-regulation and the adoption of model
standards.335 In June of 1995, the International Task Force on Corporate
Governance of the International Capital Markets group issued a report
329. See generally infra Part VI.
330. See supra discussion of ongoing refinement of techniques, Part III.A.
331. See generally supra note 327.
332. See, e.g., discussion of increasing use of the internet for investor communications,
supra note 294.
333. PETER C. LINCOLN, INVESTOR RELATIONS: THE USER'S PERSPECTIVE IN THE
HANDBOOK OF INVESTOR RELATIONS, (Donald R. Nichols, ed.)(1989) at 52-63.
Many securities analysts believe that stock and bond prices of an individual
company can achieve more appropriate levels in the marketplace when the
organization's operations and management strategies are properly understood
through a constant communications process . . . If these conditions of
understanding and credibility can be achieved, along with appropriate market
recognition, the cost of capital to the organization can be reduced and enterprise
performance has been improved. If securities prices reach appropriate levels
of recognition . . . stockholders objectives are better achieved, and the
possibility of hostile outside takeovers is reduced.
Id. at 53.
334. Improving Communications Between Corporations and Shareholders: Overall
Findings and Recommendations, PREPARED ON BEHALF OF THE NEW FOUNDATIONS
WORKING GROUP, Center for Business and Government, Kennedy School of Government,
Harvard University, Jan. 1994.
335. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN EUROPE, CENTER FOR EUROPEAN POLICY STUDIES,
CEPS Working Party Report No. 12 (June 1995).
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which concluded that . . . "governance needs to improve and not impede
the performance of companies for the benefit of shareholders, other
stakeholders and communities at large. Both international prescription of
corporate governance and over-regulation and bureaucracy at a domestic
level need to be avoided. 3 3 6 The group believes convergence of systems
should be allowed to take place naturally.
33 7
VI. CONCLUSION
Mr. Eddie George, the Governor of the Bank of England, remarked at
a conference in 1992:
Since Communism collapsed and is no longer a competitor, the
focus of attention has switched to alternative ways of making
market economies work more effectively .... We feel that our
system suits our temperament and history, but in some ways it
has become sloppy and needs tightening up. The tone of the
[Cadbury] committee's findings is that a voluntary approach is
preferable to regulation or legislation ... provided it works....
Let us hope that when progress is monitored, the conclusion does
not become inescapable that stronger enforcement will be
required.338
As Mr. George anticipated, international standards for best corporate
governance practices are being shaped by market forces as international
investors and corporations are learning new standards and practices through
their participation in the increasingly global search for capital. Local
customs, rooted in often anachronistic historical practice, are beginning to
change as they are perceived as sources of weakness and
uncompetitiveness in the global marketplace. New standards of corporate
accountability are emerging, usually with local adaptation.
The largest global corporations and institutional investors are leading
the way. Non-U.S. institutional investors are following, though somewhat
reluctantly, and are seeking effective means, within the context of local
336. ICMG, supra note 248, at 10. The report is a cooperative venture of the
International Federation of Accountants, the Section of Business Law of the International
Bar Association, and the Federation Internationale des Bourses de Valeurs.
337. Id. at 12.
338. Mr. Eddie George, Governor of the Bank of England, Address at the Confederation
of British Industry (CBI) President's Conference (on file with author). As this note went




customs and reputation, to meet the higher standards demanded by the
marketplace.
Increasing shareholder activism and market forces ensure that
standards of corporate governance will be, if not standardized, at least
harmonized over time. The vital question is whether the process will be
accompanied by meaningful self-regulation or whether substantial
government regulation will be required as an enforcement mechanism.
Government regulation is difficult to amend or repeal and will be slow
to adapt to the inevitable market changes that globalization will bring. It
is the conclusion of this note that the interests of all market participants
will be better served by self regulation, which allows for a flexible
response to market conditions. The greatest threat to self-regulation is the
tendency toward laxity that it may breed. Corporate managers hold within
their power, by taking self-regulation seriously, the ability.to minimize the
prospects of intrusive government regulation.
Mary E. Kissane
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